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with all or most of the attributes of traditional property. In this 
article we try to explain this trend by examining one important 
new kind of property, the publicity right. Publicity rights initially 
emerged in response to functionalist considerations: transferable 
rights were needed to keep pace with commercial custom. As time 
went on, courts began to expand the attributes of the right to new 
frontiers, such as inheritability. In taking this leap, courts generally 
relied on the following chain of reasoning: "since the right is as-
signable, it must be property, and since it is property, it must have 
attribute X (which is shared by all property)." This type of reason-
ing continues to dominate many cutting-edge publicity rights de-
bates in the courts and commentaries today, such as the debates 
over the treatment of publicity rights as full-fledged property upon 
divorce and bankruptcy. Our aim here is twofold: I) to propose a 
new, ideological/ conceptual explanation for part of the explosion 
in new forms of property: once an article acquires one of the attrib-
utes of property, legal actors will label it property and thus it will 
tend to acquire the other traditional attributes of property as well; 
and 2) to criticize this sort of conceptualist reasoning with respect 
to publicity rights and elsewhere and to reorient the debate back 
down to the rich, ground-level policy issues. 
INTRODUCTION 
The century just ended witnessing a continuing expansion 
both in governmental protection of different entitlements in prop-
erty and in judicial and legislative willingness to treat such recogni-
tion as carrying with it the familiar attributes that older forms of 
property enjoy, such as descendability and transferability. Agricul-
tural allotments, broadcast licenses, and taxi medallions are earlier 
examples. More recent additions are airport landing slots, domain 
names on the web, and pollution permits. 
In dealing with these newer forms of property, courts and leg-
islatures could have chosen a functionalist approach, determining 
whether an interest should be treated as property for a particular 
purpose in the light of the policies that its recognition serves. Al-
ternatively, a formalist approach would treat labeling an interest 
"property" as automatically carrying with it an unvarying package 
of attributes without regard to the reasons the interest was given 
governmental protection in the first place. Our chief thesis here is 
that the formalist approach has been dominant in judicial and leg-
islative treatment of a variety of new kinds of property, including 
the subject of this essay: publicity rights-the right of an individual 
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to control the commercial use of her identity. 1 
Publicity rights were first judicially recognized in New York in 
1953,2 and they have been growing (both geographically and in 
their scope) ever since. Today, such rights are recognized, either 
under the common law or by statute, in twenty-eight states,3 and 
there has been a monumental amount of scholarship on the sub-
ject. Nonetheless, little ink has been expended in showing why the 
right has experienced such startling expansion. One scholar, 
Michael Madow, attributes this expansion to interest group 
pressure,4 while another, George M. Armstrong, Jr., credits some 
deep urge generated by the capitalistic system towards 
commodification. 5 
More general explanations of the evolution of new forms of 
property similarly focus on large-scale political and socio-economic 
trends. One prominent strain of scholarship argues that property 
law responds to the dictates of economic efficiency: new forms of 
property therefore emerge when they will help to maximize 
wealth.6 Richard A. Epstein is in this camp to some extent when he 
stressed that new forms of property rights tend to emerge out of 
custom, with custom often being a better indicator of efficiency 
1 See J. THOMAS McCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PuBucnY AND PRIVACY § 1.3 (2d ed. rev. 
2003). 
2 See Haelan Laboratories Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 
1953). 
3 See McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 6.3. The amounts of money hovering around the 
exploitation of these rights appears to be quite substantial. For example, kstar tennis play-
ers and golfers earn three to five times their prize money from endorsements and other 
nontournament sources.ff RoBERT H. RuxIN, AN ATHLETE'S GumE TO AGENTS 131 (4th ed. 
2003) (noting, though, that athletes in team sports earn a lower percentage of their total 
income from exploiting publicity rights). 
4 See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity 
Rights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 125, 177-78 (1993). 
[A]s the ~celebrity industry~ has grown in power, organization, and sophistica-
tion, and as the costs involved in celebrity production have soared, the pressure 
for legal commodification of personas has intensified. This is pressure that 
would-be appropriators (and consumers who might share their interests in free 
use) have had neither the cohesion, lawyering skill, nor lobbying muscle to 
counter this pressure effectively. The result has been a steady stream of judicial 
decisions and statutes recognizing a property-like right of publicity and ex-
panding its scope. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
5 See George M. Armstrong, Jr., The Rei.fication of Celebrity: Persons as Property, 51 LA. L. 
REv. 443 (1991). 
6 See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a 17iel»y of Property Rights, 79 A'1. EcoN. REv. PRoc. 
347 (1967) (arguing that property rights will form and grow as economic scarcity increases, 
using as an example Native-American rights to fur); Anderson & Hill, The Evolution of Prop-
erty Rights: A Study of the American West, 18].L. & EcoN. 163 (1975) (testing Demsetz's theory 
on resource and water rights in the American West); Symposium, The Evolution of Property 
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 331 (2002) (devoting itself largely, although not entirely, to test-
ing, refining, and reworking the Demsetz thesis). 
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than economic analysis. 7 Carol M. Rose suggested that property 
law responds to some idea of general welfare that encompasses, but 
is larger, than economic efficiency. For example, the enhance-
ment of sociability is included in her notion of welfare.8 The whole 
idea that property law responds primarily to efficiency has been 
challenged by another group of scholars, who have argued, like 
Matlow, that political considerations and the power of certain in-
terest groups may entrench new forms of property even if they are 
inefficient. 9 
In contrast to all of this work, which focuses on broader social 
movements, our explanation of the evolution of publicity rights 
stays squarely within the realm of law and legal discourse. We stress 
the nature of legal reasoning and the ideological constructs that it 
places on actors within the legal world, both courts and 
commentators. 
In Part I, we trace the history of publicity rights, showing how 
the right initially emerged for the narrow, functionalist purpose of 
permitting assignability, thus serving as an example of Epstein's 
thesis that property law will tend to acquiesce in developing com-
mercial customs. However, publicity rights later went well beyond 
custom and grew to include inheritability as well. The expansion 
of the right beyond assignability was driven largely by a form of 
reasoning that we call the "property syllogism." This reasoning 
started with the premise that because publicity rights had certain 
attributes of property, like assignability, they were a form of prop-
erty, and then moved from this premise to the conclusion that be-
cause publicity rights are property, they must be fully inheritable. 10 
7 See Richard A. Epstein, International Nro;s Seroice v. Associated Press: Custom and Law as 
Sources of Property Rights in Nro;s, 78 VA. L. REv. 85 ( 1992); but see Richard A. Epstein, The 
Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public Roads, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 515 (2002) (noting that 
"top-down" politics can sometimes get in the way of this process and lead to inefficiency). 
8 See Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 711 (1986) (using beaches and roads as support for her thesis 
that courts consider sociability, in addition to wealth maximization, as one element of ser 
cial welfare). 
9 See, e.g., DouGLASS C. NORTH, STRucruRE AND CHANGE IN EcoNOMIC HISTORY 13-44 
(1981) (noting that while property rights regimes will have some tendency to push towards 
efficiency, politics can and often does warp this process); Saul Levmore, Two Stories about 
the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 421 (2002) (stating that against the opti-
mistic, efficiency-based story of property rights evolution, one must also be aware that 
property rights are often the resulr of inefficient capture by interest groups); Robert H. 
Nelson, Private Rights to Government Action: How Modern Property Rights Evolve, 1986 U. ILL L. 
REv. 361 (arguing that the first steps towards institutionalizing new forms of property are 
often taken by judges for reasons of efficiency, but that as the legislature gets involved in 
later stages, political pressures become paramount and inefficiency often results). 
10 The story that we tell about publicity rights here could, we think, also be told about 
many other new forms of property, such as broadcasting rights. Spectrum itself has always 
been considered property of the United States government, with the FCC assigning broad-
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Thus, once publicity rights acquired one of the attributes of prop-
erty, they were held to be property and moved towards acquisition 
of all of the attributes traditionally associated with property. 
In Part II, we explain why the scope of the right has also 
changed dramatically. While initially, publicity rights protected 
only an individual's name and likeness, it has grown to encompass 
virtually any indicia of identity. Our explanation of this develop-
ment focuses on the deep-seated urge of judges, as well as com-
mentators, to be consistent and logical, and to avoid arbitrary lines 
at almost any cost. There simply is no clear line, nor any strong 
countervailing principle, stopping protection at name and likeness. 
Part III deals with two cutting-edge issues with respect to the 
right of publicity: treatment as property upon divorce and treat-
ment as property upon bankruptcy. In both cases, we show that 
the property syllogism has continued to ring loudly in the heads of 
both courts and commentators, structuring the early treatment of 
those issues. We try to steer the debate back to the underlying pol-
icy issues raised by each context. 
Finally, this article concludes by undertaking a normative eval-
uation of the right of publicity in light of the distortions of judicial 
reasoning that we have identified in the first three parts. Because 
the right itself should be neither strongly supported nor strongly 
opposed, we conclude that the chief area of controversy with re-
spect to publicity rights in the future will probably relate to its pre-
cise contours. Here, we hope that our critique of judicial and 
scholarly reasoning, particularly the property syllogism, can play a 
large role in forcing legal actors to go beyond conceptualism and 
to examine the ground-level policy issues involved in each area of 
concern. Our analysis also offers a stern warning against imbuing 
other rights or privileges with some, but not all, of the attributes of 
property for some narrow functionalist purpose. The modes of ju-
dicial reasoning that we have identified in this article make it likely 
cast rights over a particular range of spectrum to companies after public interest hearings .. 
In return, these companies were supposed to use their assigned spectrums for public pur-
poses, and if they failed to do so, the FCC could refuse to renew the license. See, e.g., 
Lawrence J. White, "Pmpertyzing" the _Electromagnetic Spectrum: Wny ft 's Important, and How to 
Begin, 9 MEDIA L. & PoL'Y 19, 22-24 (2000). But as the assigned rights began being re-
newed virtually automatically, the public interest requirements began to fall away, and lot-
teries began to be used to distribute spectrum; FCC bureaucrats, legislatures, and courts 
began seeing these broadcast rights as a form of property. And this, in turn, has often had 
interesting result~ consistent with our general thesis: several courts have recently overruled 
the FCC and held that broadcast rights must be usable as security for credit, because broad-
cast rights have clearly become a fonn of property (despite explicit statutory language to 
the contrary!), and one attribute of property is that it may be used to secure a debt. 
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that expansion of the right towards other, less desirable traditional 
aspects of property will occur. 
I. FROM FUNCTIONALISM TO FORMALISM: THE HISTORY OF 
PUBLICITY RIGHTS 
A. Haelan 's Functionalist Approach 
In I 953, the Haelan Laborataries, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. 
court, coined the term "right of publicity," 11 though it was pro-
tected in several distinct forms well before Haelan. An older line of 
cases protected publicity based on a natural copyright theory-a 
person had a natural property right in her name and likeness. 12 A 
second line of cases that became dominant after the publication of 
Warren and Brandeis' famous privacy article13 emphasized instead 
that the appropriation of someone's identity for a newspaper ad-
vertisement or similar use was a violation of her privacy rights. 14 
Sometimes well-known plaintiffs were barred from recovery under 
this privacy theory because, by virtue of their fame, they were con-
sidered to have waived their privacy rights. 15 If the waiver defense 
was not accepted, both theories could enable famous plaintiffs to 
recover for unauthorized commercial use of their likenesses. In 
other words, pre-Haelan law gave celebrities the right to use their 
likenesses for making money and it also gave them the right to 
exclude others from making such uses. 
In this context, what Haelan really did was to make the right of 
publicity alienabl,e via assignment or license. In Haelan, a famous 
baseball player signed an exclusive baseball card contract with one 
company, Haelan. 16 A rival company, Topps, printed cards with 
pictures of the same player. 17 Perhaps the player could have sued 
11 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). In Haelan, a diversity case, the court applied the com-
mon law of New York. Ironically, three decades later, New York rejected Haelan and its 
common law right of publicity, holding that the only relevant law in force in the state was a 
much more limited statute protecting a right to privacy (which, for example, is non-de-
scendible). See Stephano v. News Group Publ'ns, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y. 1984). 
But by then, the right of publicity had been widely recognized in other states. 
12 See Robert Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appropriation, 41 
CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 647, 648 (quoting Munson v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076, 1079 (Mo. App. 
l9ll)); see also Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 67 A. 392, 395 (NJ. Ch. 1907) 
(granting relief to Thomas Edison based on such a theory). 
13 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 5 HARV. L. REv. 220 
(1890). 
14 See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
15 See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoss. 203, 204-06 
(1954). Even when the waiver defense was not accepted, famous plaintiffs sometimes were 
awarded only minor damages on the theory that famous people could not have suffered 
much mental anguish from having their likenesses publicized. See id. at 207--09. 
16 Haelan, 202 F.2d at 867. 
17 See id. 
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Topps himself for a breach of his right to privacy, if he had not also 
given permission to Topps to print cards. The real question, 
though, was whether Haelan, the baseball player's assignee, could 
sue Topps directly.18 Without much discussion, the court answered 
in the affirmative, and in the process coined the term "right of 
publicity."19 
1 
A few things stand out about Judge Frank's opinion in Haelan. 
First, he avoided giving any reason why recognition of the right of 
publicity was necessary. 20 There is no discussion of whether an al-
ternative approach, such as reinterpreting and broadening federal 
unfair competition law, could achieve most of what he was trying to 
accomplish by creating a brand-new right under the common law 
of New York.21 The right to publicity, in other words, was created 
in a somewhat ad hoc manner. 
But a second key point with respect to Judge Frank's reason-
ing is that it was eminently functionalist. Frank's new right arose 
out of the older idea of the right to privacy, but the Judge clearly 
felt that he was creating an "independent" right that was not con-
strained by the old parameters of a privacy rights claim.22 What 
Judge Frank was doing by creating a new right was to respond to a 
pre-existing business practice: baseball card companies had been 
signing exclusive contracts with players for some time prior to the 
decision.23 
Id. 
1s See id. 
19 Id. at 868. 
20 See Matlow, supra note 4, at 173-74. 
He made no attempt ... to explain why this should be cause for judicial con-
cern. Indeed, he offered no rationale whatsoever for the new right beyond the 
fact that, without it, celebrities would be denied image revenues .... Most 
importantly, the Haelan opinion contained not a trace of moral or conceptual 
uneasiness about the commodification of personality. 
21 In Canada, publicity rights arose historically from the "passing off tort," although 
recent trends in Canadian law have been influenced by American jurisprudence. Robert 
G. Howell, Publicity Rights in the Common Law Provinces of Canada, 18 Lov. L.A. ENT. L.J. 487, 
489,490 (1998). In the United States, some publicity actions can also be brought as unfair 
competition actions under § 43(a) of the Federal Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) 
(2004), where the offending use of name or likeness would be likely to create a false sense 
of endorsement in the public's mind. See, e.g., ·white v. Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc., 971 F.2d 
1395 (9th Cir. 1992) (allowing such a Lanham Act claim to survive summary judgment). 
However, the basic state law publicity claim does not require an alleg-ation of false 
endorsement. 
22 See Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868 (stating 
[w]e think that, in addition to and independent of that right of privacy ... a 
man has a right to the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant 
the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture, and that such a grant may 
validly be made 'in gross,' i.e., without an accompanying transfer of a business 
or of anything else). 
23 See J. Gordon Hylton, Baseball Cards and the Birth of the Right of Publicity: The Curious 
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Similar practices were occurring in other areas of the en-
tertainment industry.24 They were doing so despite the fact that 
such agreements were often held unenforceable.25 The newfound 
popularity of these contracts was probably rooted in changes to 
American culture, particularly in notions of fame. 26 The fact that 
such agreements continued, despite being frowned upon legally, 
should have been strong evidence that they were efficient and use-
ful ways to organize entertainment-based endorsements in the 
modern world; it is often more efficacious for legal norms to reflect 
business usage than to try and reshape it. 27 Thus, in resting on 
prior business practices, Judge Frank was on solid ground in en-
dowing publicity with the property-like characteristic of assignabil-
ity. 28 But Judge Frank was adamant that he was only creating an 
Case of Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, 12 MARQ. SPORTS LJ. 273, 279-81 
(2001). 
Id. 
24 See Madow, supra note 4, at 166. Madow notes that, prior to Haemn: 
[C)ertain key economic actors had already begun to behave as if celebrity 
images were garden variety "commodities." Movie studios were routinely licens-
ing the images of their players to advertisers and merchandisers in exchange 
for money payments, favorable publicity for their own ventures, or free supplies 
or props. A number of licensing companies were even formed for the specific 
and sole purpose of marketing the names and faces of famous persons. The 
law, however, had not yet caught up with these new commercial practices. 
25 See, e.g., Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 78 F.2d 763, 767 (5th Cir. 1935) 
(holding that such an assignment acted only as a waiver of the assignor's privacy rights and 
not a right to sue a third party infringer). Haelan expressly disagreed with Hanna on this 
point. See Halean, 202 F.2d at 869. 
26 One major factor, of course, was the rise of the mass media and the shift from a 
print-based media to a photographic, movie and television-based media. See Roberta Ro-
senthal Kwall, Fame, 73 IND. LJ. l, 27-34 (1997); Madow, supra note 4, at 160-64. Another 
factor was a shift from an older view that having one's face exploited commercially was 
degrading to the subject to a newer idea that this form of marketing was morally accept-
able and even desirable. See Armstrong, Jr., supra note 5, at 459. The expansion of the 
advertising market also played a role. See id. at 457-61; Madow, supra note 4, at 164-65. 
27 An underlying purpose of the Uniform Commercial Code is "to permit continued 
expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the par-
ties .... " U.C.C. § 1-102(2); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text (exploring Ep-
stein's view that new property tends to be created from custom, although this process is 
sometimes distorted by politics). 
28 Further evidence of the importance, from a business standpoint, of having an assign-
able right of publicity comes from German and French law. Germany has a right of public-
ity that is considered wholly personal and is not considered at all property-like. See 
Susanne Bergmann, Publicity Rights in the United States and in Germany: A Comparative Analy-
sis, 19 Lov. L.A ENT. LJ. 479, 513 (1999). Nonetheless, when faced squarely with the 
question of whether an assigned publicity right could be enforced by the assignee against a 
third party competitor, a high-ranking German court allowed the assignee to recover its 
usual licensing fee by using a convoluted legal theory. Id. French courts have also made 
publicity rights essentially assignable despite the theoretically personal nature of the right, 
thus allowing "the development of image licensing and marketing." Elisabeth Logeais & 
Jean-Baptiste Schroeder, The French Right of Image: An Ambiguous Concept Protecting the 
Human Persona, 18 Lov. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 511, 532-35 (1998). Notably, German law does 
not make publicity rights descendible as such, although next-of-kin do have a right, as an 
assertion of their own independent interests, to prohibit unconsented displays of the de-
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assignable right, not a right that was necessarily property or one 
that was endowed with all of the characteristics of property.29 
B. The Taxation of Income from Transfers of Publicity Rights: An 
Example of Functionalist Reasoning 
In 1962, one of the early courts to deal with the right of pub-
licity30 had to face a novel question: whether a license by Glenn 
Miller's widow of a publicity right to a movie production company 
constituted the transfer of a capital asset, and thus subject to the 
lower capital gains tax rate, or merely ordinary taxable income. 31 
Since the Internal Revenue Code generally defines a "capital asset" 
as "property held by the taxpayer," subject to specified exclusions, 
the question was whether the interest she transferred was property 
for income tax purposes.32 The court refused to hold that it was.33 
In reaching that conclusion, the court first emphasized that while 
some courts had recognized the publicity rights of a live celebrity, 
these rights were not necessarily "property rights," and, in fact Hae-
lan "carefully avoided terming" publicity rights as property rights, 
"no doubt in order to avoid the unintended consequences which 
might follow from such classification."34 Not everything that one 
pays for, the court noted, is property.35 Further, the court stressed 
that no court had held publicity rights to be inheritable, and it 
ceased's image for a period of ten years. This seems to have some kinship with the notion 
of moral rights in continental law. See Bergmann, supra note 28, at 514-15. The majority 
and traditional view under French law is similar-personality or publicity rights are not 
inheritable, although next of kin have some right to object to uses that would offend the 
deceased's memory. See Logeais & Schroeder, supra note 28, at 535-36. Some French 
courts seem to be moving towards descendibility, although this remains very much the 
minority view. Id. at 537-38. Interestingly, like American courts, the French courts that 
have held persona rights descendible have done so by separating the right into moral (like 
the American right to privacy) and economic (like the American right to publicity) compo-
nents, holding the former component wholly personal and thus non-descendible but the 
latter naturally "patrimonial" and thus descendible. Id. At any rate, German and French 
law suggests that there is not as much functionalist pressure to make publicity rights de-
scendible as there is to make these rights assiqnable. 
29 See Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868 ("Whether it be labeled a "property" right is immaterial; 
for here, as often elsewhere, the tag "property" simply symbolizes the fact that courts en-
force a claim which has pecuniary worth."). The current state of the law is that publicity 
rights are both freely assignable and freely licensable, even without any transfer of underly-
ing assets or goodwill (contrary to trademark law). See McCARTHY, supra note 1, Ch. IO. 
30 See Miller v. Comm'r, 299 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1962). 
31 Id. at 707-08. 
32 Id. at 708. 
33 Id. at 711. 
34 Id. at 708-09 & n.4. 
35 Id. at 709-10 (stating that, for example, one can sell time and experience). The 
court also noted that the payment involved in this case's contract could have been a hedge 
against the recognition of an inheritable property right, a release from any possible liabil-
ity, rather than a payment for such a right. Id. at 710. "One can easily find wisdom in this 
payment by Universal without finding that it paid for property.ff Id. at 710 n.8. 
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suggested that any court should be extremely cautious before do-
ing so.36 
Finally, the court stated that the case should not be decided 
wholly according to general conceptions of property: one should 
look at the taxation context on its own merits. 37 In reaching its 
decision, the court relied on the social policy against giving prefer-
ential treatment under the tax code too freely. 38 The approach in 
Mil/,er v. Commissioner represents a continuation of the functionalist 
reasoning stressed in Haelan-the parameters of publicity rights 
should be determined on a case-by-case basis, looking to policy 
considerations and not via the simple act of labeling the rights 
"property." However, about the same time that Mill£rwas decided, 
several important commentators were moving the concept of a 
publicity right toward full-fledged property. 
C. The Shift from Functionalism to Formalism 
The evolution toward a property-based view of publicity oc-
curred in the 1950s and 1960s, primarily in the academic commen-
taries, because most courts remained hostile to the right during 
this early period. 39 As a result, in the 1970s, when courts began 
viewing it more favorably,40 publicity had already been labeled as 
"property" by the commentators. 
Prosser, writing in 1960, pigeonholed publicity rights into his 
four-pronged privacy tort test, calling it the tort of "appropria-
tion."41 He echoed Frank in insisting that "[i] t seems quite point-
less to dispute over whether such a right is to be classified as 
property. "42 At the same time, however, he emphasized that "ap-
propriation" was very different from the other three prongs of his 
privacy tort: intrusion, public disclosure of private facts, and false 
light; "[t]he interest protected is not so much a mental as a propri-
etary one."43 Because the right is "proprietary," Prosser continued, 
36 Miller, 299 F.2d 706. 
37 Id. at 710-11. 
38 Id. at 711. The court noted that if limits were not found, every exchange of money 
could be seen as the sale of a capital asset. Id. at 711 n.9. 
39 See Matlow, supra note 4, at 176 & n.247 (noting that "courts were initially reluctant 
to embrace the new right.~). 
40 See McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1.32 (noting that in the 1970's, "a deluge of litigation 
and commentary marked the coming of age of the Right of Publicity."). 
41 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 401-07 (1960). 
42 Id. at 406. 
43 Id. A less influential commentator strongly disagreed with Prosser, insisting that the 
single unifying strand underlying all of Prosser's four torts was the protection of human 
dignity. See Edward J. Blaustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean 
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 1000-03 (1964). Thus, Blaustein saw the commercial tort not 
as protecting pecuniary interests, but rather dignity interests like the avoidance of 
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it ought be assignable, and thus Haelan was correctly decided.44 
The thrust of Prosser's reasoning seems to focus on the type of 
damage that is done (monetary vs. intangible mental harm), rather 
than the underlying object protected (name or face), and to sug-
gest that there is something different when the harm being 
avoided is lost money rather than damaged feelings. 45 Such a 
right, Prosser implied, should be given stronger, more property-
like forms of protection than the other aspects of the right to pri-
vacy, although he seemed to think that the content of these protec-
tions should be decided on a policy-centered, case-by-case basis.46 
Prosser's reasoning was very influential and was codified in the 
Second Restatement of Torts, for which he was Chief Reporter. 47 The 
Restatement preserved Prosser's four-pronged approach but made 
some subtle changes, which took the appropriation tort a few steps 
further toward full-fledged recognition as property. For example, 
the Restatement noted that while "protection of personal feelings 
against mental distress" is one factor leading to the right of public-
ity, nonetheless the right created "is in the nature of a property 
right."48 Further, it stated that the publicity right is clearly assigna-
ble and may also be inheritable, given that its infringement "is simi-
lar to impairment of a property right."49 Thus, what appears to 
"turn[ing] a man into a commodity and mak[ing] him serve the economic needs and 
interest of others ... against his will." Id. at 988. He rejected the view that the right of 
publicity should be called property, asserting that the right basically protected the same 
interests as the other privacy torts, which clearly were not (and are not) seen as species of 
property. Id. at 990-91. He thought that if publicity rights were labeled "property," it 
would be harder to find "the common ground" between Prosser's four torts. Id. In this 
view, Bloustein was somewhat prophetic. If he had been a more prominent commentator 
than Prosser, the propertyization of publicity rights might not have occurred. 
44 See Prosser, supra note 41, at 406-07. 
45 The characterization of damages as economic or commercial rather than mental 
seems to make a difference in the eyes of courts and commentators. For example, French 
law has begun to separate the moral component of persona rights from the economic or 
commercial component and to hold that the latter is inheritable while the former is not. 
There is something inherently "patrimonial," one court suggested, about the commercial 
aspect of persona. See Logeais & Schroeder, supra note 28, at 537-38. 
46 The Supreme Court itself suggests this kind of thinking in its only case dealing with 
the right of publicity. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 566 
(1977). In Zacchini, the Court noted that the right to publicity protected "proprietary in-
terests" and analogized the right to intellectual property rights like patent and copyright. 
In the process, it seems to suggest that a proprietary right like the right to publicity may be 
entitled to more protection against free speech challenges than other tort claims like a 
right to privacy claim or a defamation claim. It is difficult to generalize with any confi-
dence about Zacchini, however, because the facts involved are so strange-normally, right 
to publicity claims are about advertisers using the identities of celebrities, not about a news 
station stealing a performer's entire act, as in Zacchini. Thus, the Zacchini case was essen-
tially about "performance value" rather than the typical "persona value" case. See Matlow, 
supra note 4, at 208 n.395. 
47 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 652C (1977). 
48 Id. § 652C cmt. a. 
49 Id. § 652I cmts. a & b. 
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have occurred in the Second Restatement involves the transformation 
of Prosser's arguments, based on the contrasting interests underly-
ing his four prongs of privacy tort, into the simplistic syllogism that 
the appropriation tort is property, and therefore various attributes, 
such as inheritability, must follow. 
If Prosser nudged publicity away from its functionalist roots 
and towards a more formalist view as "property," Melville Nimmer 
shoved it in the same direction. Troubled by the limitations of the 
traditional privacy rights (including, but not limited to, waiver, 
non-assignability, damages only for mental distress and not for 
profitability and the requirement that the use be offensive), he in-
sisted without qualms that "[t]he right to publicity must be recog-
nized as a property (not a personal) right."50 To cement his 
property-based theory even further, he linked publicity rights with 
Locke's labor-based rationale for property.51 Interestingly, it 
seemed to have never occurred to Nimmer that one could have 
assignability without all the other traditional attributes of property. 
Indeed, he seems to see the issue as an all or nothing choice be-
tween a totally personal privacy right in one's likeness, such as ex-
ists in several European countries,52 and a completely property-like 
right of publicity. 
Nimmer's view of publicity rights was closely followed by an-
other influential commentator. In 1960, Harold Gordon wrote 
that despite Judge Frank's words in Haelan, publicity must be 
deemed property; "the tag 'property'" is "material as furnishing a 
firm basis for distinguishing between claims which have a solid pe-
cuniary basis and those involving injured feelings."53 Further, 
Gordon went beyond Nimmer to state explicitly that the fact that 
50 Nimmer, supra note 15, at 216. Interestingly, to make his theory more palatable, 
Nimmer misstated the holding of Haelan, claiming that the Haelan court "clearly held that 
the right of publicity, unlike the right of privacy, is a property right .... " Id. at 222. In 
fact, the Court in Haelan held that the issue of whether publicity was property "immate-
rial." Id. 
51 Id. at 216 (stating: 
[i] t would seem to be a first principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence ... that 
every·person is entitled to the fruit of his labors unless there are important 
countervailing public policy considerations. Yet, because of the inadequacy of 
traditional legal theories ... , persons who have long and laboriously nurtured 
the fruit of publicity values may be deprived of them, unless judicial recogni-
tion is given to what is here referred to as the right of publicity.). 
52 See Juuus C.S. PINCKAERS, FROM PRIVACY TOWARD A NEW INTELLECTUAL PROPERIT 
RIGHT IN PERSONA: THE RIGHT OF PUBLICIIT (UNITED STATES) AND PORTRAIT LAw (NETHER-
LANDS) BALANCED WITH FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND FREE TRADE PRINCIPLES 6-14 (1996) (no 
publisher listed). 
53 Harold R. Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality, and History, 55 Nw. 
U. L. REv. 553, 607 (l 960). Gordon seemed particularly concerned that the proper mea-
sure of damages be used: the damages for this new property right should be based on the 
"profit-making of the appropriation," rather than "compensation for injured feelings." Id. 
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publicity rights are a form of property means that they must be 
inheritable.54 Thus, by the 1960s, the commentators had made a 
strong push towards re-characterizing the right of publicity as a 
full-fledged intangible property right.55 
D. The Descendibility Issue and the Triumph of Legal Formalism 
Today, the question of the descendibility of publicity rights is 
essentially settled. Either by common law or statute, the vast major-
ity of states that have recognized publicity rights allow them to be 
asserted after the death of the celebrity,56 although at least one 
state statute provides for termination of the right if the celebrity 
did not transfer it inter vivas or by will and left no surviving spouse, 
parents, children, or grandchildren.57 However, about two de-
cades ago, there was a raging debate, both in courts and in law 
reviews, as to whether the right should be descendible. 58 The 
courts that dealt with the issue were heavily influenced by the con-
ception, forged in the commentaries listed above, that publicity 
rights are "property"; hence, according to the reasoning in its most 
54 Id. at 612 (stating: 
Recognition of property rights in this area also clarifies the rights of a personal 
representative and next 
0
of kin of deceased persons. If any individual, public 
figure or not, possesses a property right in such intangibles as his name and 
likeness, these rights do not pass into the public domain after death, but rather, 
accrue to the deceased's estate .... ). 
55 Perhaps one clue as to the significant influence these commentators had on the 
courts is that one of the few important decisions from the end of the L960s was able to state 
confidently that there was no disputing the fact that "plaintiff has a valuable property right 
in his name, photograph and image." Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205, 1206 (8th Cir. 
1969). Similarly, the court in Uhlaender v. Hendrickson, 316 F.Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 
1970) confidently described the right of publicity as a "type of property," based on the 
labor justification given in Nimmer. Id. at 1282. 
56 See McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 9.17 ("The overwhelming majority rule under either 
statute or common law is that the right of publicity is descendible property .... "). The 
Third Restatement of Unfair Competition also clearly states that the majority rule is that 
the right to publicity is descendible, although noting that many jurisdictions have not con-
sidered the question. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. h (1995) 
(hereinafter THIRD RESTATEMENT]. Most European countries hold the right to be personal 
and thus non-descendible, although next of kin may have some right, for a period of time, 
to stop publication of the deceased's name or likeness, at least if the use is offensive to the 
deceased's memory. See PINCKAERS, supra note 52, at 6-14; see also supra note 29. There has 
been considerable confusion about the descent issue in recent years in many European 
countries. See PINCKAERS, supra note 52, at 7. 
57 See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1075/15 (West 2002). In contrast, the Virginia statute pro-
vides that a consent or license may be obtained from the "surviving consort," or if none, 
from the next of kin, suggesting that the right passes under the statute and the celebrity 
may not dispose of it by will. See VA. CoDE. ANN. § 8-650. 
58 For two of the best contributions on opposite sides of this now dead debate, see Peter 
L. Felcher and Edward L. Rubin, The Descendibility of the Right of Publicity: Is There Commercial 
Life After Death? 89 YALE LJ. 1125 (I 980) (in favor of descent); Steven J. Hoffman, Limita-
tions on the Right of Publicity, 28 BULL. CoPYRJGHT Soc'v 111, 133-39 (1980) (opposed). 
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simplistic and formalistic form, they must be descendible.59 
In one of the first cases to deal with this question and one that 
has been cited by virtually all later cases dealing with the issue, Price 
v. Hal Roach Studios, 60 the court emphatically embraced the idea 
that the right of publicity is descendible, stating: 
Since the theoretical basis for the classic right to privacy, and of 
the statutory right in New York, is to prevent injury to feelings, 
death is a logical conclusion to any such claim. In addition, 
based upon the same theoretical foundation, such a right to pri-
vacy is not assignable during life. When determining the scope 
of the right of publicity, however, one must take into account 
the purely commercial nature of the protected right. Courts 
and commentators have done just that in recognizing the right 
of publicity as assignable. There appears to be no logical reason 
to terminate this right upon death of the person protected. It is 
for this reason, presumably, that this publicity right has been 
deemed a "property" right. 61 
The Price court echoed both Prosser's point about pecuniary 
and commercial interests being entitled to more and different pro-
tection than nonpecuniary interests and Nimmer's assumption that 
the right to publicity should be seen as property in all of its aspects. 
Importantly, the court cited both Nimmer and Gordon in arriving 
at its conclusion that the right of publicity is a property right.62 
The "publicity is property, hence it is descendible" idea, a subset of 
the property syllogism, was taken to its greatest extreme in Price--
no policy reasons at all were given in favor of inheritability.63 
59 At least two commentators have noticed, in passing, the syllogistic quality of the argu-
ments made by some judges in favor of descendibility. See Ben C. Adams, Recent Develop-
ment, Inheritability of the Right of Publicity Upon the Death of the Famous, 33 V AND. L. REv. 1251, 
1260-61 (1980); Hoffman, supra note 58, at 134 ("Deciding a right of publicity issue by 
applying property law opens the door to questionable syllogisms." Having given the right 
of publicity the conclusory label "property," the court then reaches the result that flows 
from its conclusory characterization "the right of publicity is a property right; property is 
inheritable; ergo, the right of publicity is inheritable.") (citing Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, 
Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978)). 
60 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
61 Id. at 844. 
62 See id. 
63 Basically the same approach was taken, some years later, by the first New Jersey court 
to hold publicity rights to be descendible: 
In deciding whether this right of publicity survived Presley's death, we are per-
suaded by the approach of other courts which have found the right of publicity 
to be a property right. These courts have concluded that the right, having been 
exercised during the individual's life and thus having attained a concrete form, 
should descend at the death of the individual "like any other intangible prop-
erty right." 
Presley's Estate v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1355 (D.NJ. 1981). Notably, the court cited 
Gordon, as well as some more recent commentators like Felcher & Rubin. Id. at 1355 n.9. 
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In other cases, the same syllogism was used, buttressed by a few 
weak and poorly explained policy reasons. In Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro 
Arts, Inc., one of the myriad postmortem cases involving Elvis Pres-
ley, the Second Circuit wrote: 
There can be no doubt that Elvis Presley assigned [the licensee] 
a valid property right, the exclusive right to print, publish, and 
distribute his name and likeness .... The identification of this 
exclusive right belonging to [the licensee] as a transferable 
property right compels the conclusion that the right survives 
Presley's death."64 
The court then supported this assertion with the policy observation 
that extinguishing the right at Presley's death would "grant com-
petitors" of the licensee "a windfall."65 However, it is virtually im-
possible to give any real normative content to this statement-what 
is the standard to determine which gains in this type of situation 
are unjust, or ill-gotten, or windfalls? It seems equally plausible 
that the heirs or legatees of the deceased would gain a windfall if 
they were able to charge for use of the deceased's name and 
likeness.66 
A similar syllogism plus policy approach was applied by State 
ex. R.el. Elvis Presley lnt'l Mem'l Found. v. Cromwell, the Tennessee 
Court of Appeals case that recognized descendibility.67 The court 
first emphasized that property usually possessed a fixed bundle of 
attributes including descendibility,68 and then, citing Hal Roach, 
64 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978). In this case, the court saw itself as applying New York 
law. See id. at 220. In a later case dealing with virtually the same subject matter, the court 
realized that it should be applying Tennessee law, and it held on the basis of Sixth Circuit 
precedent that Tennessee would not allow the right to publicity to be descendible. See 
Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981). 
65 579 F.2d at 221. The same basic argument was used in Chief Justice Byrd's earlier 
dissent in the famous Bela Lugosi case. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 600 P.2d 425 (Cal. 
1979). Chief Justice Byrd, disagreeing with the majority, argued that the right of publicity 
should be descendible primarily because it was a property right and not a personal right. 
She also compared publicity rights to copyTights, and noted that publicity like copyright 
should be protected even after death because of the labor theory of property. Id. at 445-46. 
This type of unreflective analogy to copyright and Lockean labor theory seems very similar 
in form and depth to the property syllogism itself. Finally, Chief Justice Byrd noted, as a 
policy concern, the windfall argument. 
66 If descendibility is governed by a state statute rather than the common law, a celeb-
rity may not have the power to dispose of the right by will if it passes 10 statutory designees 
on her death. See supra note 57. 
67 See State ex. rel. Elvis Presley Int'I Mem'l Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89 (Tenn. 
App. 1987). This Tennessee decision resolved an earlier split in lower Tennessee courts. 
For a good overview of the convoluted Tennessee story, see David C. Bodette, Note, Use It 
(Euery Two Years) or Lose It (Forever) - Tennessee's Rights Protection Act and the Post-Mortem Right 
of Publicity, 33 U. MEM. L. REv. 83 (2002). In Tennessee the issue has been foreclosed by a 
statute providing for descendibility. TENN. CooE ANN.§§ 47-25-1101-1108 (2001). 
68 See Bodette, supra note 67, at 96-97. 
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emphasized that "[i)f a celebrity's right of publicity is treated as an 
intangible property right in life, it is no less a property right at 
death."69 The court then added several policy justifications.70 
There were a few dissenting voices in the chorus. Several 
courts refused to extend publicity rights to the postmortem period. 
Sometimes, the reasoning of these courts was just as syllogistic as 
the reasoning of those courts that allowed descendibility-publicity 
rights are personal and not property rights, hence they are not de-
scendible.71 However, the two most cited and important anti-in-
heritability decisions-Lugosi v. Universal Pictures72 and Memphis 
Development Foundation v. Factors, Inc.73-both contained searching 
analyses of the policy issues involved. These decisions emphasized 
the following concerns: (1) the exploitation of fame for the benefit 
of one's heirs is at best a weak motivation for effort;74 (2) that fame 
itself is often a product of luck or the actions of the public and 
press more than those of the celebrity and can be acquired by bad 
actions as well as good;75 (3) that making the right descendible via 
common law creates durational line-drawing problems;76 (4) that 
the right seems increasingly to conflict with free expression princi-
ples the longer it lasts;77 (5) that the right, whether property or 
not,78 (6) seems very personal and therefore the power of exploita-
69 Id. at 97-98. 
70 Prominent among these was the same rather specious windfall/unjust enrichment 
argument made in Factors, Etc. Id. at 98. However, the court also touched on a few other 
policy justifications, including protecting the expectations of the deceased and the con-
tracting party and avoiding false endorsement claims to protect the public. Id. at 98-99. 
None of these justifications are particularly strong: the expectations of the actors involved 
seem, in this case, to be heavily influenced by the choice of legal rule, and the false en-
dorsement issue (which of course arises also during the life of the celebrity) could be taken 
care of through a much less expansive system of rights, like those in the federal Lanham 
Act. 
71 See, e.g., Reeves v. United States, 572 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ohio 1983) ("In light of the 
Ohio Supreme Court's clear language linking the right of publicity more closely to the 
right of privacy than to a property right, this Court must conclude that under Ohio law, the 
right of publicity, like the right of privacy, is not descendible."), affd, 765 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 
1985). 
72 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979). Lugosi is a somewhat confusing decision; some have inter-
preted it as only foreclosing inherit.ability in cases where the deceased celebrity never ex-
ploited the publicity rights during his lifetime, see, for example, 2 McCARTHY, supra note 1, 
§ 9.13; Adams, supra note 59, at 1260, but it is difficult to say whether recovery would have 
been denied even with exploitation because the opinion is very vague. At any rate, the 
policy reasons that are given apply across the board to the inheritability issue. 
7s 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980). 
74 See id. at 958-59. 
75 See id. at 959. 
76 See id.; Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 430. 
7 7 See Memphis Development, 616 F.2d at 959-60; Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 430-31. 
78 See Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 431 ("[W]hether or not the right sounds in ton or property, 
and we think with Dean Prosser that a debate over this issue is pointless, what is at stake is 
the question whether this right is or ought to be personal."). 
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tion should not be passed on to heirs for moral reasons;79 (7) and 
the problems that would arise if the right were subject to estate 
tax.BO 
Despite the well-reasoned nature of these decisions, they were 
few in number and were not widely followed. Instead, most later 
courts unquestioningly relied on the reasoning of the earlier courts 
that had favored inheritability. Many of these later courts, without 
any extensive reasoning, simply noted that descendibility had be-
come the majority rule in American jurisdictions and therefore 
should be followed.B 1 Thus, courts carved out a descendible right 
of publicity without much thought to the policy issues lying behind 
such a right-earlier courts relied primarily on the conclusion that 
the publicity right was a species of property, and later courts relied 
primarily on the earlier court decisions as precedent. 
The only important court decision coming out in favor of 
descendability that did not seem to rely on the property syllogism 
was the Georgia Supreme Court's in Martin Luther King Jr. Ctr. V. 
American Heritage Products case.B2 The majority did note that most 
commentators recognized that if the right was assignable, it must 
also be descendible,B3 but it purported to rest its decision primarily 
on policy considerations. First, the right encourages effort and cre-
ativity (like copyright) and cutting it off at death would seriously 
impair its value during life and erode commercial certainty as 
79 See Memphis Development, 616 F.2d at 959; Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 430. One problem 
hinted at by the Lugosi court is that many celebrities may choose not to exploit their public-
ity rights for reasons of taste or judgment; these wishes should be honored and yet may be 
breached post mortem by greedy heirs. See id. at 430. 
80 See Memphis Development, 616 F.2d at 959. At least one court has held that publicity 
rights, if descendible under state law, are subject to estate tax. See Estate of Andrews v. 
United States, 850 F. Supp. 1279 (E.D. Va. 1994). The Memphis Development court did not 
get into these issues, but one problem that would arise if the right were subject to estate tax 
at fair market value is that the tax would effectively pressure the heirs into exploiting the 
publicity rights as much as possible (selling lots of advertising and merchandising), even if 
they or the deceased celebrity would prefer not to exploit the rights for dignity or other 
reasons (think, for example, of Martin Luther King,Jr.). See Note, Federal Estate Tax and the 
Right of Publicity: Taxing Estates far Ceklnity Value, 108 HARV. L. REV. 683, 692-93 (1995) 
(recommending that the right be subject to estate tax but also that heirs have a right to 
renounce the right's exploitive value upon death and thus avoid the tax); see also infra text 
accompanying notes 163-165, 173 ( discussing similar pressures in divorce and non-Chapter 
7 bankruptcy contexts). 
Bl See.Jim Henson Prods. v. John T. Brady & Assoc., 867 F. Supp. 175, 189-90 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994) (interpreting Connecticut law and holding that it would recognize a descendible 
right of publicity because of the policy reasons listed in Crowell and because descendibility 
was the overwhelming majority rule); Nature's Way Prods. Inc. v. Nature-Pharma Inc., 736 
F. Supp. 245, 2.''>2 (D. Utah 1990) (holding that the Utah Supreme Court "would follow 
what appears to be the majority and modern rule that the common law right of publicity 
sunives the death of the subject person."). 
82 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982). 
83 See id. at 493. 
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licensees would be less willing to pay for a right that could be cut 
off suddenly at any time. The court also reasoned that competitors 
would be unjustly enriched if they could freely profit from some-
one else's identity (essentially, the ,vindfall argument in a slightly 
different form). 
These arguments are hardly overwhelming. We have already 
criticized the windfall argument as specious. The encouragement 
of creativity argument is problematic even during life because first, 
fame is not a product of labor nearly as directly as a copyrighted 
book,84 and second, advertising and merchandising is usually an 
incidental and not a primary activity for the celebrity,85 who often 
is already rich (despite the surprising number who have filed for 
bankruptcy) .86 Thus, it is doubtful if enhanced advertising and 
merchandising revenue will actually encourage the celebrity to 
work harder.87 The idea that celebrities will work much harder so 
that they can pass enhanced publicity values on to their heirs seems 
particularly farfetched.88 The commercial certainty idea-that 
licensees would favor rights with a more fixed duration and not an 
arbitrary cut-off date in case of a celebrities' untimely death-is 
perhaps the best policy argument for post-mortem publicity rights. 
Commentators did pay considerably more attention than 
courts to the policy issues involved in making the right to publicity 
descendible. There are some thoughtful policy debates in the liter-
ature.89 But ossification of publicity rights as descendible neverthe-
less proceeded inexorably, when many states codified their 
84 See Madow, supra note 4, at 179-96. 
85 But see supra note 3. 
86 See Melissa B. Jacoby & Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the 
Uncharted Boundaries of the Right of Publicity, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1322, 1325-26 (2002) (report-
ing that a "casual search" turned up "dozens" of celebrity bankruptcies in the recent past). 
87 See Madow, supra note 4, at 208-15. 
88 See Hoffman, supra note 58, at 136. 
89 See, e.g., Adams, supra note 59 (favoring inheri.tability after rejecting the simple anal-
ogy to property and instead exploring various policy rationales); Felcher, supra note 58 
(listing a number of policy arguments in favor of a descendible right and criticizing the 
analogy to property, adopting instead a somewhat more tailored analogy to copyright); 
Hoffman, supra note 58, at 133-39 (arguing strenuously on policy grounds that the right to 
publicity should terminate at death); Roberta Rosenthall Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning 
for the Right of Publicity, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 191, 228 (1997) (giving a comprehensive 
policy analysis explaining why the right of publicity should be descendible). Still, commen-
tators, like courts, were not wholly immune from the property syllogism. See, e.g., Note, The 
Right of Publicity - Protection for Public Figures and Celebrities, 42 BROOK L. REv. 527, 545 
(1976) (4 0nce the publicity right is accurately depicted as a property right, the conclusion 
that it passes on death flows as a matter of course."); Andrew B. Sims, The Right of Publicity: 
Survivability Reconsidered, 49 FoRDHA'v! L. REv. 453, 497 ( 1981) (arguing that publicity rights 
should be inheritable by combining the property syllogism with policy arguments like 
avoiding urtjust enrichment and providing career incentives for celebrities); Timothy P. 
Terrell & Jane S. Smith, Publicity, Liberty, and Intellectual Property: A Conceptual and Economic 
Analysis of the Inheritability Issue, 34 EMORY LJ. l (1985) (arguing the converse of the prop-
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common law right of publicity and included inheritability provi-
sions with various durational limits attached.90 In this case, the stat-
utes were not really breaking new ground; they were simply 
following a path already set by the common law decisions reviewed 
above.91 
E. The Lifetime Exploitation Requirement as a Symbol of 
Formalist Reasoning 
The lifetime exploitation requirement is another issue related 
to inheritability, which demonstrates the extraordinary grip of the 
property syllogism on the minds of judges. Many of the early deci-
sions to recognize descendibility held that publicity rights could 
only be passed on if there was evidence that they had been ex-
ploited in some form during the life of the celebrity.92 These deci-
sions gave no policy grounds for the requirement, and yet for a 
number of years it proved to be remarkably persistent.93 However, 
there are persuasive policy grounds against requiring lifetime ex-
erty syllogism, that publicity rights should not be inheritable because they are not specific 
enough to be property rights). 
90 For an overview of these statutes by state, see 2 McCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 9.17-.37. 
Further, the right was clearly recognized as a "property right" in the THIRD RESTATEMENT 
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, see THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 56, § 46 cmt. g, and it was 
noted that the majority rule is that publicity rights are descendible, although interestingly 
some doubts were expressed about the strength of the policies lying behind this majority 
rule, see id. cmt. h ("As a general matter ... the dignitary and proprietary interests that 
support the recognition of a right of publicity become substantially attenuated after death. 
Post mortem uses are also less likely to create a false suggestion of endorsement or 
sponsorship."). 
91 Doubdessly, interest group pressure also played a role. See Madow, supra note 4, at 
177 (noting the growing lobbying power of the "celebrity industry" and arguing that it has 
not been matched by interests on the other side of these issues). For example, in Califor-
nia, a statute passed in 1985 and expanded in 1999, created a descendible publicity right 
after the California Supreme Court in Lugosi refused to allow the state's common law pub-
licity right to be inheritable. CAL. CIV. CoDE § 3344.1 (Deering Supp. 2003). Interest 
group pressure seemed to play a large role in the enacunent of this statute, at least in its 
revision. See Rhett H. Laurens, Year of the Living Dead: California Breathes New Life in Publicity 
Rights, 23 HASTINGS Co.MM. & ENT. LJ. 109, 123-30 (detailing the power that the celebrity/ 
agent lobby had in shaping the 1999 "Astaire" revisions to the law, as well as the strength of 
lobbying groups like the ACLU and the Motion Picture Association of America on the 
other side). 
92 See, e.g., Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, rev'd on other 
grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp 426, 429 
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). Lugosi is sometimes interpreted as hinging on a lack of lifetime exploita-
tion by the celebrity because of certain language in the majority opinion. See Lugosi, 603 
P.2d at 429-30. Good overviews of the lifetime exploitation requirement are given in 2 
McCARTHY, supra note l, §§ 9.11-.15; Kwall, supra note 89, at 217-26; and Sims, supra note 
89, at 472-83. 
93 See2 McCARTHY, supra note l, § 9.14 ("[T]he 'lifetime exploitation' requirement ap-
peared out of nowhere in the case law and was parroted by courts thereafter. Neither at its 
genesis nor thereafter did a court bother to explain the why or wherefore of having such a 
requirement."). 
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ploitation as a condition of inheritability.94 
The strongest contrary argument surely would not focus on 
exploitation as evidence that the deceased was motivated to 
achieve fame because of her hope for publicity rights, as some 
commentators have suggested.95 The extensive publicity that has 
been accorded to the high potential financial stakes from success-
ful exploitation, may have caused these hopes to motivate the dece-
dent, even if she failed to exploit her rights during her lifetime. A 
sounder basis for requiring lifetime exploitation would be to use 
the decedent's willingness to have the right exploited during her 
lifetime. as evidence that the decedent had no objection to post-
mortem exploitation by others. Alternatively, a requirement that 
the right be specifically disposed of either inter vivos or by will 
would insure that exploitation would be carried on only by a per-
son or institution that she had chosen (or the legatee's assignee) 
rather than by operation of a statute.96 However, courts that con-
tinued to adhere to the lifetime exploitation requirement for so 
long, without addressing the policy concerns just referred to in any 
meaningful way, probably did so because it made publicity rights 
seem more tangible and specific, and thus more like property.97 
The more publicity rights seemed to be like property, the easier it 
9 4 See, e.g., Note, An Assessment of the Commercial Exploitation Requirement as a Limit on the 
Right of Publicity, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1703, 1717-18 (1983) [hereinafter Commercial Exploitation 
Requirement]. This Note states that: 
If the legal system is willing to recognize a survivable right of publicity, no ra-
tional justification exists for differentiating between public figures who mar-
keted their names during their lifetimes and those who did not .... The 
individual who has a right of publicity possesses a property right in an image 
and should be entitled to sell that right or keep it, in accordance with her own 
determination of which use of the property is best for her. Given that property 
can be seen as a means of protecting individuals from economic exploitation by 
others, the legal system should not make such protection contingent upon a 
showing that the individuals engaged in activities that may have affronted their 
senses of dignity. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
95 See Felcher, supra note 58, at 1130-31. 
96 See VA. CooE. ANN § 8-650, discussed supra note 57. Of course a general intestacy 
statute could apply, in the absence of such a provision. In contrast, § 304(a) (1) (c) of the 
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1) (c), grants renewal rights for some copyrighted works 
of deceased authors to the author's "widow, widower, or children ... [or if they are not 
living, to] the author's executors ... or ... the author's next of kin, in the absence of a will 
of the author." However, publication or other use of copyrighted works seems far less 
likely to be contrary to the wishes of the deceased author than exploitation of a right of 
publicity. 
97 See Commercial Exploitation Requirement, supra note 94, at 1114 (lamenting the urge to 
use the lifetime exploitation requirement to "physicalize" the right of publicity because, 
" [ w] e should not hamper the birth and development of new attitudes about what property 
is and why it exists by remaining hypnotized by a vision of property grounded on the idea 
of physical possession."); see also Terrell, supra note 89, at 28-32 (noting that the term prop-
erty implies some element of "specificity"); cf Armstrong,Jr., supra note 5, at 464-65 (sug-
gesting that judges used the lifetime exploitation requirement to justify inheritability of 
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was for courts to allow them to be inheritable.98 
IL TRENDS IN THE ScoPE OF Pusuc11Y RIGHTS: ExPLA1NING 
EXPANSION AND STABILI1Y 
91 
Publicity rights have shown a remarkable tendency to expand 
along some dimensions, while remaining basically static in other 
respects, and the reasons for both trends merit explanation. Our 
argument here, once again, stresses the power of concepts and the 
nature of judicial reasoning. The attributes of identity that are pro-
tected have undergone a dramatic if unsteady expansion from the 
original focus on name or picture.99 The most important agent of 
this expansion, which has generally been followed by other juris-
dictions, has been the Ninth Circuit in its interpretations of Cali-
fornia law. We argue that courts greatly expanded the scope of 
publicity rights along this dimension because it lacks any obvious 
common sense stopping point, and judges dislike drawing arbitrary 
lines. However, where countervailing principles like free speech 
were clearly implicated in a much more problematic manner than 
heretofore (really, where the countervailing principle posed a new 
type of problem altogether, and not simply a somewhat more in-
tense manifestation of an old problem), courts tended to refuse to 
expand the right. 
A. R.apid Expansion in Protected Indicia of Identity 
California statutory law protects only name, voice, signature, 
photograph, and likeness. 100 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit has 
held that there is an independent California common law right of 
publicity rights until they became more comfortable with the notion of publicity as 
property). 
98 Eventually, the lifetime exploitation requirement did fizzle out, probably because its 
dubious rationale slowly became apparent even to judges who found it psychologically use-
ful. See2 McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 9.15. Currently, the lifetime exploitation requirement 
is the law in only one state, Utah. See Nature's Way Prods. v. Nature-Pharma. Inc., 736 F. 
Supp. 245, 252 (D. Utah 1990) (mistakenly characterizing lifetime exploitation as "the ma-
jority and modern rule."). Tennessee, in contrast, has a post-mortem exploitation require-
ment. By statute, it expressly negates any lifetime exploitation requirement, see TENN. 
CODE ANN.§ 47-25-1103(b) (2001), but provides that after an initial ten year post-mortem 
period of an exclusive right to commercial exploitation that is descendible to the individ-
ual's assigns, heirs, or devisees, the right can be "terminated by proof of non-use by an 
executor, assignee, heir or devisee to such use for a period of two (2) years subsequent to 
the initial ten (10) year period ... ." id. § 47-25-1104(b)(2); see also Bodette, Note, supra 
note 67, at 103-104 (criticizing the two-year exploitation requirement). 
99 See, e.g., Madow, supra note 4, at 177 & n.255; David W. Melville & Harvey S. Perlman, 
Protection f&r W&rks of Authorship Through the Law of Unfair Competition: Right of Publicity and 
Common La:w Cofrjright Reconsidered, 42 ST. Louis U. LJ. 363, 392-93 (1998); Sudakshima 
Sen, Comment, Fluency of the Flesh: Perils of an Expanding Right of Publicity, 59 ALB. L. REV. 
739, 748-49 (1995). 
100 CAL C1v. CoDE § 3344 (Deering Supp. 2003). 
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publicity that reaches beyond these enumerated attributes. First, it 
held in 1974 that the right of publicity could protect a famous race 
car driver whose distinctive looking car was used in an advertise-
ment, even though the driver himself was not identifiable in the 
advertisement. 101 Then, it held in two decisions that although the 
statute only encompassed actual uses of a celebrity's voice, the 
common law would also protect sound-alike imitations. 102 
Finally, in a famous case, the court held that game show host-
ess Vanna White was protected, under California common law al-
though not under the statute, from a robot that was identifiable as 
her (although it was clearly not a "likeness") because of its dress, 
pose, and the familiar "Wheel of Fortune" background. 103 The 
court suggested that celebrities would be protected from any use in 
which the celebrity was identifiable, because "[a] rule which says 
that the right of publicity can be infringed only through the use of 
nine different methods of appropriating identity merely challenges 
the clever advertising strategist to come up with the tenth." 104 
Thus, "[i] t is not important how the defendant has appropriated 
the plaintiffs identity, but whether the defendant has done so."105 
Other courts have also expanded the scope of protected attributes 
to encompass Johnny Carson's catch phrase "Here's Johnny,"106 
Guy Lombardo's nickname as "Mr. New Year's Eve,"107 and football 
star Elroy Hirsch's nickname "Crazylegs." 108 Indeed, it is clear that 
101 Motschenbacher v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974). 
The court did not specify whether it was relying on the California statute or the common 
law. Id. at 826-27. 
102 See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v. Ford 
Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463-64 (9th Cir. 1988). 
103 White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992). 
104 Id. at 1398. The court added: 
Indeed, if we treated the means of appropriation as dispositive in our analysis 
of the right of publicity, we would not only weaken the right but effectively 
eviscerate it. The right would fail to protect those plaintiffs most in need of its 
protection. Advertisers use celebrities to promote their products. The more 
popular the celebrity, the greater the number of people who recognize her, 
and the greater the visibility for the product. The identities of the most popular 
celebrities are not only the most attractive for advertisers, but also the easiest to 
evoke without resorting to obvious means such as name, likeness, or voice. 
Id. at 1399. 
105 Id. at 1398 (emphasis added). A more recent, similar case was Newcombe v. Adolf 
Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691-94 (9th Cir. 1998) where the court stated that there was a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant, a beer company, appropriated 
a famous baseball pitcher's identity by stealing his distinctive stance. However, this case 
technically went forward under the "likeness" prong of California Code section 3344, not 
the common law "identity" test. Id. at 694 & n.3. Statutory stretching can thus be used to 
achieve the same result as expansion of the common law. 
106 Carson v. Here's johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831, 835-37 (6th Cir. 1983). 
107 Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane, & Bernbach, Inc., 396 N.Y.S.2d 661,664 (App. Div. 1977). 
108 Hirsch v. S.C.Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 137-38 (Wis. 1979). Yet another 
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the predominant standard in American jurisdictions for invasion of 
a plaintiff's right of publicity has become the vague, broad notion 
of "identifiability,"109 despite the judiciary's initial focus only on 
"name and likeness,"110 a plethora of statutes that claim to protect 
only a small specified set of attributes, 111 and a firestorm of protest 
from the commentators.112 
How did this expansion evolve? Much of the answer springs 
from the vague principle initially underlying the right, which, as 
expressed in Haelan, was the idea that if one's image had value, 
and was going to be used to help sell a product, then one should 
be compensated for that use. 113 From this angle, as White noted, it 
seems arbitrary and illogical to stop the parameters of the right at 
strand of cases held defendants liable for using celebrity look-alikes in their advertise-
ments. See, e.g., Allen v. Nat'! Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
109 See, e.g., THIRD REsTATEMENT, supra note 56, § 46 cmt. d. (essentially adopting the 
identifiability test, at least as long as the attribute is "so closely and uniquely associated with 
the identity of a particular individual that their use enables the defendant to appropriate 
the commercial value of that person's identity."); I McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 3.18 (argu-
ing that identifiability is the current state of the law). 
I IO See, e.g., Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205, 1206 (8th Cir. 1969) (stating that the 
publicity right encompasses "name, photograph, and image"); Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868 (fo-
cusing solely on the right of a person "in the publicity value of his photograph" or his 
"likeness[ }"). 
111 For an overview of these statutes and the attributes they protect, see 1 McCARTHY, 
supra note 1, § 6.8. All of the statutes protect at least "name and likenesst and some go 
beyond this to also protect one's photograph and/or voice. Id. 
1 12 See, e.g., Melville & Perlman, supra note 99, at 394-95, 408 (arguing that the further 
away from name and likeness one moves, the less celebrity interest there is, and thus it 
becomes more likely that this interest will be outweighed by public interests in free expres-
sion and free competition); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of 
Publicity, 9 DEPAUL-LCAJ. ART & ENT. L. & PoL'Y 35, 45-48 (1998) (stating that the number 
of protected attributes within the right of publicity, along with other aspects of the right, 
must be cut back to avoid damaging free speech rights and impoverishing the public do-
main). The most withering critiques seem to have been reserved for the White case. See, 
e.g., Steven C. Clay, Starstruck: The Overextension of Ceklmty Publicity Rights in State and Federal 
Courts, 79 MINN. L. REv. 485, 517 (1994) (arguing that White "continues a long line of state 
and federal cases that fail to adequately justify the right of publicity's existence, or to make 
any kind of accounting of the social costs imposed by the right of publicity in its current 
expansive form" and suggesting that the publicity right be replaced by a much narrower 
"performance right"-the right to prohibit others from stealing your persona to compete 
against you in your primary line of work); Sen, supra note 99, at 751-60 ( claiming that the 
White decision in particular threatens important free expression values, particularly the 
social importance of a vibrant culture and the right to parody); Fred M. Weiler, The Right of 
Publicity Gone Wrong: A Case for PrivUeged Appropriation of Identity, 13 l.ARDOZO ARTs & ENT. 
LJ. 223, 268 (1994) ("The White decision ... tips whatever balance the right of publicity 
had previously attained between the celebrity and the public in favor of the celebrity."). 
Much of this criticism of YV'hite was probably fed by Judge Kozinski's angry dissent from the 
denial of rehearing en bane. White, 989 F.2d at 1512 (Kozinski, CJ., dissenting). Judge 
Kozinski objected to the panel's decision on free speech, utilitarian, and copyright pre-
emption grounds. 
113 Haelan, 202 F.2d 866. ("[I}t is common knowledge that many prominent persons ... 
far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would 
feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements, 
popularizing their countenances .... "). 
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"name and likeness," particularly if (as is clearly true) certain celeb-
rity identities can be appropriated as effectively or even more effec-
tively via other means. 114 Legislatures can be and often are 
arbitrary-that is why many legislatures included a short laundry 
list of actionable attributes in their statutes. But courts are con-
strained by logic-that is why courts keep using the common law to 
expand the list of attributes beyond those in the statutes. Iden-
tifiability, as broad as it is, strikes one as the most logical stopping 
point. 115 Further evidence of this is that the courts of many foreign 
countries, often despite theoretically being constrained by statute 
to protect only certain attributes like name, portrait, and signature, 
have developed similar notions of identifiability when determining 
infringement of publicity/ privacy rights. 116 
114 Other courts that expanded the list of actionable attributes expressed similar senti-
ments to the White court. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988). 
Why did [the defendants] studiously acquire the services of a sound-alike and 
insuuct her to imitate Midler if Midler's voice was not of value to them? What 
they sought was an attribute of Midler's identity. Its value was what the market 
would have paid for Midler to have sung the commercial in person .... A voice 
is as distinctive and personal as a face. The human voice is one of the most 
palpable ways identity is manifested .... The singer manifests herself in the 
song. To impersonate her voice is to pirate her identity. 
Id; see also Carson, 698 F.2d at 837 (finding that the 
right of publicity has developed to protect the commercial interest of celebri-
ties in their identities. The theory of the right is that a celebrity's identity can 
be valuable in the promotion of products, and the celebrity has an interest that 
may be protected from the unauthorized commercial exploitation of that iden-
tity .... If the celebrity's identity is commercially exploited, there has been an 
invasion of his right whether or not his "name or likeness" is used . . . . It 
should be obvious ... that a celebrity's identity may be appropriated in various 
ways). 
115 Melville and Perlman, although they do not really attack the identifiability standard, 
do argue that it may be logical to only protect a celebrity's name and likeness, and not 
other indicia of her identity, or at least to protect name and likeness more strongly than· 
these other indicia. Melville & Perlman, supra note 99, at 392-93. They base this argument 
on the idea that publicity rights derive from privacy rights, which are fundamental to tort 
law, and that name and likeness are more "likely to be regarded within the personal 
sphere" than other aspects of identity. Id. at 393. There are two problems with Melville 
and Perlman's analysis. First, publicity rights may have stemmed from privacy rights, but 
they are clearly also independent of those rights-the right question to ask is not simply 
which aspects of plaintiff's identity are most personal but rather which aspects have value 
to an advertiser based on appropriating the celebrity's image. Publicity rights, according 
to most courts and commentators, seem to be based at least as much on pecuniary value as 
on human dignity concerns. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 31-44, and n.91 and accom-
panying text; see also infra Part III (evaluating the policy/philosophical justifications both 
for and against publicity rights). Second, it is not at all clear that name and likeness always 
are more personal than other attributes of someone's identity-someone's voice or nick-
name, for example, can be every bit as personal. 
116 See, e.g., Bergmann, supra note 28, at 512 (noting that German courts have analo-
gized to and extended statutory protections in name and likeness to create a "general right 
of personality" that protects other aspects of identity, like voice); Silvia Martuccelli, The 
Right of Publicity Under Italian Civil Law, 18 LOY. L.A ENT. L. REv. 543, 548-54 (1998) 
(describing the judiciary's creation, via a general power to reason by analogy, of a right to 
protection for a broad swath of attributes of identity (for example, a famous singer's dis-
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A closely related problem is that there is no logical counter-
vailing principle to halt the right from spreading to reach indicia 
of identity that were previously thought to be beyond the scope of 
the right. Many of the commentators who have complained about 
this expansion have emphasized freedom of speech concerns, but 
these complaints are vague in nature. 117 The real complaint is that 
an intellectual property right infringes more on free speech con-
cerns as it gets broader in scope; there is no clear demarcation or 
logical reason why protecting a pose or nickname is any more of a 
violation of free speech rights than protecting a name or photo-
graph. Compare this to two other areas where competing princi-
ples are clearly blocking the spread of the right because judges can 
see that these competing principles are obviously implicated. First, 
even the spread of protected indicia of identity has been basically 
halted when plaintiffs have tried to get protection for roles or char-
acters that they have played in television shows, radio programs, or 
movies. 118 Surely a person can often be identified by the use of her 
character; however, courts have been somewhat cautious and reluc-
tant to extend protection. 119 This seems to be largely because the 
tinctive hat and glasses), despite statutory protection only for name, pseudonym, photo-
graph, and portrait). 
117 See supra note 112. 
118 Several commentaries have been written on this topic, with mixed recommenda-
tions. Compare, e.g., Michael A. Albano, Note, Nothing w "Cheer" About: A Call for R.efarm of the 
Right of Publicity in Audiovisual Characters, 90 GEO. LJ. 253 (2001) (ari,,uing that actors 
should not generally be able to protect the characters they play because of copyright pre-
emption), Melville & Perlman, supra note 99, at 402-04 (emphasizing that characters 
should not fall within the scope of publicity rights because an actor's roles are less personal 
than other a~pects of her identity, there is a broad swath cut out of the public domain and 
free speech rights, and protection would be preempted by the federal copyright statute), 
and Peter K Yu, Note, Fictional Persona Test: Copyright Preemption in Human Audiovisual Char-
acters, 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 355, 408 (1998) (arguing that publicity rights are preempted if 
the basis of the claim is an evocation of a "fictional persona, tt and such a fictional persona 
exists "if an average lay observer can recognize from the audiovisual character a personality 
that is substantially different from the actor's human persona." (footnote omitted)), with 
Dawn H. Dawson, The Final Frontier: Right of Publicity in Fictional Characters, 2001 U. ILL L. 
REv. 635, 662-67 (2001) (claiming that actor~ should have publicity rights in characters 
they portray so long as they are closely identified with their characters), and Kevin S. 
Marks, Note, An Assessment of the Copyright Model in Right of Publicity Cases, 70 CAL. L. REv. 
786, 811-14 (1982) (calling for a joint right of publicity in characters shared by actor and 
studio in which either party can exploit the right unilaterally but profits are split evenly 
and in which third parties have no right to use the character without the consent of either 
actor or studio). 
11 9 See, e.g., Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 625-26 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(refusing to give an actor who played a character in the movie Predator protection from a 
small toy based on that character who bore little physical resemblance to the actor, noting 
that "(c]ourts have generally been careful ... to draw the line between the character's 
identity and the actor's, siding with plaintiffs only when it is shown that the two personali-
ties are inseparable in the public's mind" so as to avoid "upset[ting] the careful balance 
that courts have gradually constructed between the right of publicity and the First Amend-
ment and federal intellectual property laws."); Wendt & Ratzenberger v. Host lnt'l, Inc. & 
Paramount Pictures Corp., 125 F.3d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that two actors from 
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federal copyright implications are so evident: creating a strong 
right of publicity in these situations will weaken the ability of the 
copyright owners of television, radio, or movies to exploit their 
rights at full value (for example, third parties will not be willing to 
pay as much for use licenses if they also must buy the actors' public-
ity rights) .12° Copyright preemption thus lurks in the background 
of these cases. 121 
B. Expansion and Stasis in Mediums for Misappropriated Material 
A second example of an area of publicity law that has re-
mained relatively stable because of a strong countexvailing princi-
ple looks not at the indicia of plaintiff's identity that has been 
infringed, but at the use by the defendant that it is allegedly in-
fringing. In this case, the First Amendment implications are obvi-
ous. Even before Peter Felcher and Edward Rubin proposed, in 
1979, a tripartite division into informational, entertainment, and 
commercial uses of identity like advertising and merchandising, 
with the former mediums generally outside the scope of right of 
publicity claims and the latter medium generally left exposed, 122 
the television show "Cheers" could not claim any rights in the characters they played on 
the show or the set of the show because such an assertion was preempted by copyright, 
although they could perhaps have a claim to the extent that robots used in Cheers bars and 
supposed to be Cheers characters bore a "physical likeness" to the actors and "it is the 
physical likeness to [the actors], not [the movie studio's] characters, that has commercial 
value to [the defendant]."); McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 920-21 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating 
that George "Spanky" McFarland could protect his film character "Spanky" only if that 
character had become "inextricably intertwined" with the actor's own identity, that is, only 
where it has become "so associated with him that it becomes inseparable from the actor's 
own public image."); see also White, 989 F.2d at 1517-18 (Kozinski, CJ., dissenting) (argu-
ing that the majority was protecting Vanna \\'hite, not as herself, but her playing her role 
on "\\'heel of Fortune," and thus that it fell afoul of copyright preemption). 
120 See Albano, supra note ll8, at 267-76. In 1981, David Shipley tried to argue that the 
possible scope of federal copyright preemption of publicity rights was very broad; most 
publicity claims involving a work of authorship or something fixed in a tangible medium 
(like a photograph, poster, etc.) should be preempted. See David E. Shipley, Publicity Never 
Dies; It Just Fades Away: The Right of Publicity and Federal Preemption, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 673, 
736-37 (1981). However, this broad interpretation of preemption has never caught on 
with the courts. See Erin S. Hansen, Note, The Right of Publicity Expands Into Hallowed 
Ground: Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch and the Preemption Power of the Copyright Act, 71 
UMKC L. REv. 171, 191 (2002): 
The courts have been all too willing to relinquish the rights of a copyright 
holder in cases in which the owner of the copyright is not even a party to the 
lawsuits. Moreover, the courts have greatly diminished the value of copyright 
holders without ever conducting a conflict analysis into whether the state right 
undermines the Congressional objectives of the Copyright Act. 
(footnote omitted). 
121 Albano, supra note ll8, at 267-76. 
122 Peter L. Felcher and Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People • 
by the Media, 88 YALE LJ. 1577, 1601-06 (1979). Felcher and Rubin were not absolute about 
these categories-they would sometimes refuse to protect informational and especially en-
tertainment uses if the predominant purpose was to exploit the celebrities involved and 
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most courts followed this schema in a rough sense. 123 Today, this 
division generally continues to be followed, 124 although as aJways 
not to seive some social function, but there seemed to be a strong presumption, particu-
larly in the case of informational (news media) uses, that publicity rights should not apply. 
12s For some of these early cases, see, for example, Hicks v. Casablanca Records & 
Filmworks, 464 F. Supp. 426,433 (C.D.N.Y. 1978) (protecting film about Agatha Christie's 
life from publicity claim on First Amendment grounds, noting that just as newsworthy uses 
are outside the First Amendment, so too "the right of publicity does not attach ... where a 
fictionalized account of an event in the life of a public figure is depicted in a novel or a 
movie, and in such novel or movie it is evident to the public that the events so depicted are 
fictitious."); Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib. Corp., 272 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 
1954) (interpreting the statute strictly to avoid applying it to company that made a musical 
show about a celebrity's life, thus avoiding First Amendment problems); Frosch v. Grosset 
& Dunlap, Inc., 427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (A.D. 1980) (protecting unauthorized book about 
the life of the deceased Marilyn Monroe and commenting that "[iJ t is not for a court to 
pass on literary categories, or literary judgment. It is enough that the book is a literary 
work and not simply a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or ser-
vices."); Current Audio, Inc. v. RCA Corp., 337 N.Y.S.2d 949,955 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (refusing 
to hold magazine liable for publishing news conference and commentary on Elvis Presley, 
including his picture on the back cover, and noting that 
[t]he scope of the subject matter which falls within the protected area of the 
'newsworthy' or of 'public interest' extends far beyond the dissemination of 
news in the sense of current events and includes all types of factual, educational 
and historical data, or even entertainment and amusement, concerning inter-
esting phases of human activity in general). 
In Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., the court protected a biography of How-
ard Hughes, since 
[t]he same requirement of commercial use which limits the New York right of 
privacy inheres in the "right of publicity." The publication of a biography is 
clearly outside the ambit of the "commercial use" contemplated by the "right of 
publicity" and such right can have no application to the publication of factual 
material which is constitutionally protected. Just as a public figure's "right of 
privacy" must yield to the public interest so too must the "right of publicity" 
bow where such conflicts with the free dissemination of thoughts, ideas, news-
worthy events, and matters of public interest. 
294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129 (Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd mem., 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (App. Div. 1969). See 
Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 458-59, 461-62 (Cal. 1979) (Byrd, CJ., 
concurring) (noting in a lengthy exposition of the interaction between publicity rights and 
the first amendment that a fictionalized film about a deceased actor's life should be pro-
tected because "[o]ur courts have often obseived that entertainment is entitled to the 
same constitutional protection as the exposition of ideas." Further, 
while few courts have addressed the question of the parameters of the right of 
publicity in the context of expressive activities, their response has been consis-
tent. Whether the publication involved was factual and biographical or fic-
tional, the right of publicity has not been held to outweigh the value of free 
expression. 
(footnotes omitted)). Some of the other important early cases, involving merchandising, 
are discussed supra note I 13. 
124 See, e.g., ETW Corp. v.Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 937-38 (6th Cir. 2003) (protect-
ing a famous artist's painting of Tiger Woods playing the Masters, which was then mass 
produced by being made into a print, on First Amendment grounds); Hoffman v. Capital 
Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184-89 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that magazine's use of 
Dustin Hoffman's head on another costumed body, made to look like one of Hoffman's 
famous poses from the movie "Tootsie,» was protected speech); White, 971 F.2d at 1401 
(declining to protect humorous advertisement on First Amendment grounds, despite a 
parody defense made by the defendants, because "[t]his case involves a true advertisement 
run for the purpose of selling Samsung VCRs. The ad's spoof of Vanna White and Wheel 
of Fortune is subservient and only tangentially related to the ad's primary message: 'buy 
Samsung VCRs."'); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004-05 (2d Cir. 1989) (refusing to 
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there are some hard cases that blur the boundaries. 
One particularly hard type of case involves merchandising. 
Generally, merchandising (for example, a celebrity T-shirt) is con-
sidered to be a commercial use, lumped together with advertising. 
But if the merchandising is particularly creative or socially valuable 
for some reason, then it might be protected. 12" A second type of 
hard case involves imitations of live productions by the celebrity. 
While this is an entertainment use, most courts have held that it 
may not be protected absent some real transformation of the mate-
rial, or some added social utility, by the defendant. 126 
The pattern that has emerged is not necessarily correct as a 
matter of constitutional law,127 but it does reflect a consistent 
apply publicity rights of Ginger Rogers to hold movie studio liable for movie titled "Ginger 
& Fred," which ·was an account about fictional imitators of the dancers); see also THIRD 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 56, § 47 (stating that the right to publicity applies if identity is 
"used in advertising the user's goods or services, or [is] placed on merchandise marketed 
by the user, or are used in connection with services rendered by the user," but does not 
normally include "use of a person's identity in news reporting, commentary, entertain-
ment, works of fiction or nonfiction, or in advertising that is incidental to such uses."). 
125 Compare Comedy III Prods Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 804-11 (Cal. 2001) 
(holding that artist's drawing of the Three Stooges used on mass-produced T-shirts was not 
protected from publicity rights claims because the use was not "transformative" in any real 
sense; it was just a copy of their likenesses), and Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 
215 (2d Cir. 1978) (preliminarily enjoining sale of posters of Elvis released after his death 
and containing the words "In Memory" under a publicity rights theory and rejecting a 
defense that the poster was privileged via the first amendment as "newsworthy"), with 
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 967-76 (10th Cir. 
1996) (holding trading cards with caricatures of professional baseball players on the front 
and humorous depictions of these players on the back protected as parody), and Paulsen v. 
Personality Posters, Inc., 299 N.Y.S.2d 501, 505-10 (Sup. 1968) (protecting unauthorized 
poster using a photograph of famous comedian and promoting his self-announced candi· 
dacy for President of the United States because his candidacy imbued the material with 
public interest, even though the candidacy was clearly intended as a joke). 
126 See, e.g., Presley's Estate v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1355-61 (D.NJ. 1981) (holding 
that a show imitating Elvis was not protected because it was not found to be creative, com-
mentary, satire, or parody); Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 
485, 492-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding a show imitating the Marx Brothers Act was not pro-
tected for the same reasons listed in Presley Estate). Part of the rationale underlying these 
decisions seems to be, as in Zacchin~ that defendant is stealing plaintiffs main income 
generating activity, i.e., his performance, not merely associating a celebrity with a specific 
product in order to sell it. See Zacchin~ 433 U.S. at 573 n.10; Rwmm, 513 F. Supp. at 1361. 
Perhaps, different rules should apply to performance value cases, as suggested in Zacchini; 
less first amendment protection may be appropriate. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573 n.10; 
Russen, 513 F. Supp. at 1361. Finally, the Supreme Court has alerted the legal community 
that sometimes, albeit rarely, the news media may be liable for a right of publicity violation. 
See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575-78 (holding that news station WdS not exempt from a publicity 
claim where it taped and broadcast plaintiffs "entire act," i.e., being shot out of a cannon, 
although a news report of the event, including some video clips, would be protected by the 
first amendment). 
I 27 See, e.g., Stephen R. Barnett, First Amendment Limits on the Right of Publicity, 30 TORT & 
lNs. LJ. 635, 643-49, 657-61 (1995) (arguing that under the Supreme Court's prevailing 
Central Hudson test, commercial speech, like advertising, actually receives significant pro-
tection, and suggesting a copyright-style use defense for advertisers to protect the right 
from first amendment challenge);Joshua Waller, Comment, The Right of Publicity: Prevent-
ing Exploitation of a Cel.e/Jrity's Identity or Promoting Exploitation of the First Amendment, 9 UCLA 
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awareness of the free speech issue. The reasons for the consistency 
of the division are that the free speech implications are so obvious, 
and the harm to the First Amendment from blocking entertain-
ment, especially informational uses, is clearly greater than the 
harm from blocking commercial uses. 
III. SOME CURRENT ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO THE RIGHT OF 
PUBLICITY AS PROPERTY 
This section, aside from giving "cutting-edge" treatment to two 
important publicity rights' issues-divorce and bankruptcy-that 
are likely to be litigated in coming years, is intended to show the 
remarkable continuing power of the property syllogism. The few 
courts and commentators that have analyzed these issues have re-
lied largely on a form of impoverished reasoning, based ultimately 
around the property syllogism. We try to steer debate away from 
these considerations by focusing on what we see as the underlying 
policy issues involved in each area, rather than the classification of 
the right as "property" or something else. 
A. Divorce 
Despite the widespread characterization by commentators and 
courts alike of publicity rights as transferable and descendible 
"property,"128 few commentators, and even fewer courts, have con-
fronted the issue of whether publicity rights are property in the 
context of divorce. Courts have, however, faced two related issues: 
(1) in dividing marital property, whether one spouse's earning ca-
pacity or goodwill, developed or increased during the marriage, 
can be treated as marital property without violating the principle 
that the other spouse's claim on post divorce earnings_ arises only 
from a right to alimony-often referred to as maintenance; and 
(2) does a claim to alimony limit the obligor's freedom to choose a 
less remunerative occupation, or retirement? 
1. Earning Capacity and Goodwill as Marital Property 
Both courts and commentators have had difficulty in distin-
guishing earning capacity, which generally is viewed as a spouse's 
separate property and hence not divisible on divorce, from busi-
ness and professional goodwill, which are generally regarded as 
ENT. L. REv. 59, 79-84 (1998) (similarly noting that under the Supreme Court's prevailing 
tests, commercial speech is substantially protected, thus courts are, perhaps, erring by 
holding that all advertisements and other types of commercial speech are automatically 
unprotected from publicity rights claims). 
12s See supra Part I.C. and l.D. 
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marital property if their value can be separated from spousal earn-
ing capacity and skills. The American Law Institute, which makes 
the distinction just described, and adds that occupational licenses 
and professional degrees are not marital property,129 identifies 
three groups of cases dealing with whether professional goodwill is 
divisible marital property: (1) those giving an affirmative answer, 
even if the goodwill, as in the case of a law practice, cannot be 
sold;130 (2) cases treating professional goodwill, at least in the ab-
sence of a sale, as always indistinguishable from earning capacity; 131 
and (3) cases that recognize the possibility of goodwill but require 
considerable caution in its valuation. 132 • 
There is no such division of judicial authority on whether pro-
fessional degrees and licenses acquired during marriage should be 
treated as divisible marital property on divorce. In O'Brien v. 
O'Brien,133 the New York Court of Appeals held that a husband's 
medical license should be so treated, a position that has been re-
jected by every state high court to consider the issue.134 The lower 
court cases in New York have treated celebrity goodwill as marital 
property in reliance on O'Brien. Thus in Golub v. Golub, 135 a New 
York trial court held that the enhanced earning capacity of a fa-
mous actress and model during marriage (celebrity goodwill), 
which was in part attributable to the efforts of her spouse, was mari-
tal property subject to equitable distribution. 136 The court first 
noted that the New York definition of marital property was quite 
broad, including "all sources of enhanced earnings capacity." 137 
The court analogized celebrity goodwill to professional degrees 
and professional goodwill, two other assets that New York courts 
have held to be divisible property because they greatly enhance the 
recipient's earning power, and it is regarded as inequitable not to 
share that earning power with the other spouse. 138 Buf the court 
also relied on the important publicity rights case of Price v. Hal 
129 See, PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: A"IALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.07, 
A.L.L (2001). 
130 See id., Reporter's Notes, cmt. d, at 708-09 (discussing Dugan v. Dugan, 457 A.2d l 
(NJ. Sup. Ct. 1983), which finds divisible goodwill in such a case, as well as in other cases 
following this approach). 
131 See A.L.L § 4.07, supra note 129, at 709-10. 
132 See id. at 710. The A.L.I. endorses this view. 
133 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985). 
134 See A.L.I. supra note 129, Reporter's Notes, cmt. a at 704. 
135 527 N.Y.S.2d 946, 950 (Sup. Ct. 1988). 
l36 See id. 
137 Id. at 949. 
138 See id. at 949-50. 
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Roach Studios, 139 commenting that the case, by holding that "the 
right to exploit a celebrity's fame ... descends to his heirs ... 
exemplifies the property nature of a celebrity's fame." 140 The famil-
iar property syllogism had reared its head once more. 
In Elkus v. Elkus, 141 involving the divorce of a famous opera 
singer, the New York Appellate Division seconded Golub' s holding 
that celebrity goodwill is marital property subject to dissolution, to 
the extent it increased because of the efforts of the other spouse, 
but it seemed to abrogate some of the lower court's reasoning. It 
agreed that under New York law, the scope of marital property is 
very broad. 142 In fact, however, contrary to the lower court's sug-
gestion, it is so broad that " [ t] hings of value acquired during mar-
riage are marital property even if they fall outside of traditional 
property concepts." 143 For example, they need not be salable, as-
signable, transferable, descendible, or have exchange value. 144 
The Elkus court, rather than relying on the property syllogism, pre-
ferred to rest its holding on policy considerations, such as the fact 
that the purpose of New York marriage law was to prevent inequita-
ble distributions of assets, and to promote more fully the partner-
ship concept of marriage.145 Thus, the high, expected, future 
earning power of a celebrity that was enhanced during the mar-
riage should be divided, including, as one component, expected 
future celebrity endorsements. 146 The Elkus court steered itself 
away from the formalist approach of Golub, and moved toward a 
more functionalist analysis. 
Although New Jersey does not follow O'Brien's treatment of 
professional licenses, 147 a New Jersey court in Piscopo v. Piscopo, 148 a 
case involving a well-known comedian, held celebrity goodwill to 
139 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). For an ovei:view of the case's holding and reason-
ing with respect to the inheritability issue, see supra text accompanying notes 60-63. 
140 Golub v. Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d 946, 949 (Sup. Ct. 1988). 
141 572 N.Y.S.2d 901 (App. Div. 1991). 
142 Id. at 902 (relying on O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)). 
Although the Elku.s court referred to the husband's contribution to his wife's career as 
determining the extent to which the appreciation in the wife's career was marital property, 
see Elkus v. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901,904 (App. Div. 1991), and at least one case refused to 
treat a husband's successful completion of actuary examinations as divisible marital prop-
erty where his wife did not contribute to his success, or sacrifice her own career prospects 
to further it, see McAlpine v. McAlpine, 574 N.Y.S.2d 385 (App. Div. 1991), it is not easy to 
find a basis for excluding career assets from the broad definition of marital property in 
O'Brien, whether or not the other spouse's efforts contributed to their acquisition. 
143 Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 902. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 903. 
146 Id. 
147 Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527 (NJ. Sup. Ct. 1982). 
148 555 A.2d 1190 (NJ. Ch. 1988), affd, 557 A.2d 1040 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989). 
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be marital property. 149 The New Jersey court emphasized that, as 
in New York, marital property in New Jersey was defined broadly to 
effectuate policies of fairness and equity, and that celebrity good-
will could be compared to professional goodwill, which was already 
protected. 150 It was only the exceptional figure, like the highly suc-
cessful lawyer, or the celebrity, who would generate this type of 
goodwill. 151 Further, the court noted, there was no reason to dif-
ferentiate between publicity rights and the general notion of celeb-
rity status because the two were "inextricably intertwined" since the 
amount a celebrity could earn from advertising generally corre-
lated well with the extent to which she was a celebrity. 152 At any 
rate, it would be unfair for New Jersey courts to vigorously protect 
publicity rights on the one hand, while not giving the spouse her 
just interest in those rights on the other. 153 
The value of the New York and New Jersey cases as precedents 
for other states was limited, for two reasons. First, both states have 
extremely broad notions of marital property.154 Second, none of 
these cases makes a clear distinction between celebrity goodwill or 
celebrity status (some vague notion of future earning power stem-
ming from being a celebrity) and publicity rights. 155 In part, the 
149 Id. at 1193. 
150 Id. at 1191. 
151 [d. 
152 Id. at 1192 n.l. The court also noted, along similar but less clear lines, that celebrity 
goodwill "has always been a component of the 'right to publicity.'" ld. at 1192. 
153 Id. 
154 See Robin P. Rosen, Note, A Critical Analysis of Celebrity Careers as Pmperty Upon Dissolu-
tion of Marriage, 61 GEo. W,\SH. L. REv. 522, 532-540 (1993) (stating "[t]he majority of 
jurisdictions employ the traditional two-pronged definition of property to evaluate whether 
intangible assets are property capable of distribution on divorce." This definition states 
that 
[t]he asset at issue must be both a separate and distinct asset and be capable of 
valuation. To be a separate asset, property must have its own value and exis-
tence apart from its holder; be susceptible of ownership, transfer, and survival; 
and be capable of sale, assignment, or pledge. To satisfy the valuation require-
ment, the property should have either an exchange value or an objective trans-
ferable value on an open market-an expectancy of future income is 
insufficient). 
(footnotes omitted). 
155 Piscc;po explicitly refused to make this distinction. See Piscopo v. Piscopo, 555 A.2d 
1190, 1191 n.l (NJ. Ch. 1988). Golub and Elkus implicitly fail to make the distinction 
between publicity rights and celebrity status. See Ellms, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 903 (referring to 
endorsements as though they were one component of a broader notion of enhanced celeb-
rity earning power); Golub v. Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d 946, 949 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (referring to 
Price v. Hal Roach Studios, 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), a publicity rights case, as 
support, but then holding that "irtually all aspects of a celebrity's enhanced future earn-
ings power were dissoluble, not only advertising revenues). Commentators have picked up 
on this distinction. See Jonathan L. Kranz, Note, Sharing the Spotlight: Equitable Distribution of 
the Right of Publicity, 13 CARoozo AR.Ts & ENT. LJ. 917 (1995). 
Treatment of a celebrity career as marital property does not adequately address 
the need to separately and distinctly subject a celebrity's right of publicity to 
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blame for this result stems from the vague character of the right of 
publicity itself. The right usually protects the use of one's identity 
in connection with advertising or merchandising. However, 
'Zacchini and a few other cases have protected a somewhat different 
interest under the rubric of publicity rights: a celebrity's right not 
to have her performance-her primary professional activity-sto-
len or imitated without her consent. 156 These "performance 
rights" cases look more as if they protect some broadly defined fu-
ture celebrity income, because for most celebrities, like actors and 
athletes, most of their income probably comes from performances, 
not from endorsements. Therefore, when we refer to publicity 
rights in this section and the next section on bankruptcy, we are 
not including performance rights. 157 The irony of Golub, Elkus, 
and Pisco/JO's vagueness is that these courts seemed to see valuation 
problems as the most significant obstacle and countervailing con-
sideration to protection of celebrity goodwill. 158 
equitable distribution. vVhile celebrity goodwill is the expectation of future pa-
tronage or future employment, a right of publicity is a right to capitalize on the 
celebrity's name and likeness. By concentrating on celebrity goodwill and rep-
utation, the courts have effectively ignored the unique and significant value of 
the right of publicity. 
Id.; see also Rosen, supra note 154, at 545 n.120, 549 n.163 (arguing that there is a distinc-
tion between publicity rights and celebrity goodwill and that the former is marital prop-
erty, while the latter is not). 
156 See, e.g., l.acchini, 433 U.S. at 575-76 (holding that the First Amendment did not bar 
plaintiff, a human cannonball specialist, from recovering based on the right of publicity 
from a news station that broadcast his "entire act," and stressing that the case was about 
Zacchini's rights to his own performance, not "the unauthorized use of another's name for 
purposes of trade.rt). See also Madow, supr<L note 4, at 208 n.395 (arguing that the tradi-
tional, advertising-based, right of publicity is different from the right of performance, that 
the rationales behind the latter, particularly the rationale that protection will lead to high 
incentives for celebrities to achieve, are much stronger than those behind the former, thus 
performance rights should certainly be protected while the traditional right of publicity is 
not necessarily worthy of support). 
157 Adding performance rights to the mix would make a celebrity's involuntary loss of 
control over her own publicity rights virtually unthinkable. If a loss of control is not in-
volved, the analysis of publicity rights as marital property or property of a bankrupt estate 
would basically remain the same with or without performance rights included. But the 
scenario of loss of control over performance rights, with the celebrity involuntarily per-
forming her primary professional activity under the direction of, and on behalf of, some-
one else, would make for a difficult situation for courts; the monitoring of the celebrity's 
effort level by the publicity right's new owner would violate the constitutional bar against 
involuntary servitude. See Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 86, at 1351 & n.163. It would 
be basically equivalent to an injunction forcing someone to work for a given employer, a 
measure that is never enforced, even if resulting from a freely signed labor contract, see, 
e.g., Am. Broad. Co. v. Wolf, 420 N.E.2d 363, 366 (N.Y. 1981). Jacoby & Zimmerman argue 
that performance rights should not be part of the right of publicity because, unlike the rest 
of the right, they are not really alienable; the property right in a celebrity's performances 
cannot be enforced against that celebrity's will. Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 86, at 
1351 n.163. If performance rights are encompassed by the right of publicity, this is a very 
good reason not to treat publicity rights as property in the bankruptcy context, or to give a 
spouse or third party, control of these rights in the divorce context. 
158 See Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 950; Piscopo, 555 A.2d at 1191, 1192-93. 
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Most of these valuation problems disappear if what is to be 
divided on divorce is publicity rights, instead of celebrity goodwill, 
at least so long as the rare "performance right" cases are ignored. 
Publicity rights in advertising and merchandising, unlike celebrity 
goodwill, are regularly assigned to agents, etc., and thus a thriving 
market exists for publicity rights. 159 Rather than using past income 
to speculate about future income, which can change for any num-
ber of reasons (as in the case of celebrity goodwill), 160 publicity 
rights can be valued more easily by estimating, through compari-
son to other, similar transactions, what a gross assignment of all of 
a celebrity's endorsement rights would fetch on the open market 
today. 
Because the few cases to deal with the issue of publicity rights 
upon divorce are of dubious value as precedents, future courts will 
likely turn to the commentators on this issue. Gary Stiffelman 
wrote one of the earliest pieces on the divorce issue, 161 in which he 
emphasized that the right of publicity really has two components: a 
"proprietary component" that protects a celebrity's economic ex-
ploitation of her fame, and a "pure privacy component" that car-
ries over from the traditional right of privacy and protects a 
person's emotional and dignity interests in being let alone, and 
unexposed to undesired publicity. 162 He contended that the pro-
prietary component, which is transferable and descendible, is 
clearly marital property, and it should be valued at its fair market 
value based on its highest and best use, even if the celebrity has 
chosen for some reason not to fully exploit his fame, just like "a 
fertile field." 163 However, the privacy component is a purely per-
sonal interest that is not property, and should not be subject to 
division. 164 As a reconciliation of these two intertwined and diver-
gent interests, Stiffelman proposes making publicity rights marital 
property, only for those forms of publicity that the celebrity has 
economically exploited, based on the theory that in these areas, 
the celebrity has waived any privacy claim to be let alone.165 
While Stiffelman took a somewhat nuanced approach to pub-
159 It is not unusual for a celebrity to assign all of his advertising and merchandising 
rights. See, e.g., McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 10.14 (explaining the various reasons why celeb-
rities assign away all of their publicity rights). 
160 Piscopo, 555 A.2d at 1192-93. 
161 See Gary S. Stiffelman, Note, Community Property Interests in the Right of Publicity: Fame 
and/lYr Fortune, 25 UCLA L. REv. 1095 (1978). 
162 See id. at 1102-09. 
163 See id. at 1119. 
164 See id. at 1122-25. 
165 See id. at 1125-28. To deal with the problem of a celebrity who had not exploited an 
aspect of his publicity rights during marriage but who later decided to do so, Stiffelman 
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licity rights, and tried to split the difference with a compromise, 
Jonathan Kranz argued unequivocally that the right to publicity 
should be marital property.166 He made two major points: first, 
jurisdictions that have (1) broad definitions of marital property 
(like New York), which sweep well beyond traditional definitions of 
property, and (2) a partnership theory of marriage, should allow 
· divisibility of publicity rights as a matter of basic fairness and eq-
uity-these rights have value that the noncelebrity spouse helped 
to enhance.167 Second, those jurisdictions that require something 
to be property-like in character before deeming it marital property, 
should also find the right of publicity to be divisible, because "the 
general view has been to treat [publicity rights] as proprietary in 
nature ... within various jurisdictions, the right of publicity may be 
assigned in gross, is enforceable despite the public character of the 
plaintiff or the public nature of the information publicized, and 
survives the death of the claimant."168 
Robin Rosen contended that Kranz's second, traditional prop-
erty approach, rather than the looser New York definition of mari-
tal property, was the proper '\\ray to approach this issue .169 As she 
argued, in order for something to be marital property: 
The asset at issue must be both a separate and distinct asset and 
be capable of valuation. To be a separate asset, property must 
have its own value and existence apart from its holder; be sus-
ceptible of ownership, transfer, and survival; and be capable of 
sale, assignment, or pledge. To satisfy the valuation require-
ment, the property should have either an exchange value or an 
objective transferable value on an open market-an expectancy 
of future income is insufficient. 170 
Because it does not fit this definition, and because of policy 
reasons (particularly the avoidance of involuntary servitude by ef-
fectively forcing a celebrity to continue working high paying jobs), 
a "celebrity career" or "celebrity goodwill," such as a degree, 
should not be considered marital property; any hardships caused 
by this rule should be fixed through maintenance payments.171 
states that courts should retain jurisdiction and have the option of changing the value of 
publicity rights considered marital property. Id. at 1128-30. 
166 Kranz, supra note 155. 
167 Id. at 948. Why enhancement (or nonenhancement) of the right by the noncelebrity 
spouse should be relevant at all is unclear, if the right is seen as property acquired during 
marriage, to any greater extent than her right to share in divorce accumulated compensa-
tion for services during marriage. 
168 Id. at 949 (footnotes omitted). 
169 Rosen, supra note 154. 
170 Id. at 532. 
171 Id. at 549-55. 
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However, because publicity rights do fit this definition, as they can 
be sold, inherited, etc, and there is an open market for them, pub-
licity rights ought to be seen as marital property. 172 
With all of the above commentators, especially Rosen, the 
property syllogism loomed large: each of them used the reasoning 
that to the extent publicity is property for other purposes, it ought 
to be property for divorce purposes as well. Further, all three of 
the above commentators, and all three cases to address the issue, 
supported at least limited categorization of publicity rights as mari-
tal property. What all of the commentators have overlooked is that 
publicity rights, whether called "property" or not, are a very unique 
kind of property because they are extremely personal in nature. 173 
At a metaphysical level, Miranda Oshige McGowan's point 
about copyright in the marriage context is relevant here: 
Community property laws may undermine an author's ability to 
control how expressions of personality are presented to the 
world by impairing her right to control the publication and li-
censing of her works .... [G]iving the spouse rights to dispose 
of the author's copyrights implies that an artistic work is no dif-
ferent than any other personal property asset owned by the mar-
riage-freely alienable by the decision of either party. Such an 
attitude inappropriately commodifies a kind of property that has 
a peculiarly close relationship to the author's self, perhaps even 
giving the spouse the ability to commodify the author's self. 174 
172 Id. at 549 n.163. Rosen appears to accept Stiffelman's distinction between purely 
private and proprietary aspects of the right of publicity, and consequently, would limit its 
division as marital property to situations where the right was already being exploited. Id. 
173 Alice Haemmerli, for example, proposes a philosophical justification for publicity. 
rights that is based in Kantian notions of human autonomy and freedom, rather than Lock-
ean labor theory. See Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 
49 DUKE LJ. 383, 421-24 (1999). 
[I]mage can be viewed as unique, a product of the peculiar mix of mental, 
psychological, and physical attributes that make tlie progenitor tlie individual 
she is ... The objectification of one's self may be viewed not as a purely exter-
nal, objective ming, but as something more ... Most people-and, many will 
agree, celebrities in particular-experience a special, even unique, attachment 
to their own images or oilier objectified attributes, and feel that those tliings 
are inextricably associated with tlieir identities. 
Id. See also Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982) (argu-
ing intuitively and on the basis of Kantian/Hegelian theory, tliat some property, like a 
person's home, is more personal man others, tlierefore is entitled to special types of treat-
ment and different kinds of protection). 
174 Miranda Oshige McGowan, Property's Portrait of a Lady, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1037, 1114, 
1116 (2001). McGowan's comments were made in tlie context of discussing control rights 
(like rights of disposal) by the non-producing spouse during a marriage, not upon divorce. 
However, tlie principle is the same: some forms of property are too personal, and too close 
to tlie self, to involuntarily share witli anyone else, even a spouse. 
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If this is true of copyright, how much more true must it be of 
publicity rights, which protect a person's very identity? 
On a more practical level, a court ordering equitable distribu-
tion of publicity rights has three choices: (1) the asset could be 
sold to a third party, and the compensation split between the 
spouses; (2) control could be split between the two spouses; and 
(3) the celebrity spouse could keep control, but be required to sur-
render equivalent amounts of cash or property to the other spouse 
to make the distribution equal. 175 
The first option is clearly unsatisfactory because it forces the 
celebrity to involuntarily relinquish all control over the commer-
cialization of her identity to a third party, and the second option 
similarly forces the celebrity to give up some of this control. For 
example, a celebrity may desire not to exploit her publicity rights 
at all for personal reasons, 176 but a third party ( in the first option), 
or her spouse (in the second option), may make endorsement 
deals because he wants more money. Further, from an economic 
standpoint, the third party's, or non-celebrity spouse's, efforts at 
control could have detrimental effects on the celebrity's career. 177 
This is particularly true in option two, where a non-celebrity spouse 
who may be driven by acrimony towards the celebrity spouse ac-
quires some control. 178 
Although commentators have suggested, in the context of 
bankruptcy, that both the first and second options may violate the 
strong, and perhaps constitutionally undergirded, public policy 
against forced labor i( the non-celebrity spouse or third party has 
the power to force the celebrity to appear in commercials or other 
promotions, 179 it is difficult to find a basis, in either divorce or 
175 Stiffelman, supra note 161, at 1119-20 (listing these options). 
176 See, e.g., \Vaits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 1992) (involving public-
ity rights case where plaintiff, a famous singer, refused to do any commercials throughout 
his career). Even if the celebrity has chosen to exploit her rights to some extent, there may 
still be personal and/or dignity interests implicated when one loses total control over how 
they are exploited. See supra text accompanying note 156. 
177 See Stiffelman, supra note 161, at 1120. 
11s Id. 
179 But see Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 86, at 1351 (stating, in order to deal with 
the same problem in the bankruptcy context, that "publicity rights are properly under-
stood as purely passive in nature; any associated right to command active participation by a 
celebrity should be understood as arising separately as a result of a specifically negotiated 
contract term."). Jacoby and Zimmerman's definition of publicity rights is rather question-
able, and not well supported. They argue, logically and consistently with some other com-
mentators, see Kranz, supra note 155, that "performance rights" should not be considered 
part of the rubric of publicity rights. See Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 86, at 1351 
n.163. But "performance rights" encompass only a celebrity's rights to perform in her 
primary field (like sports or movies). They do not include active performances by a celeb-
rity in a commercial. There seem to be no other commentators or courts who have made 
the distinction Jacoby and Zimmerman want to make between active and passive publicity 
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bankruptcy law, to support requiring a spouse to perform services 
after divorce for the holder of her rights of publicity. 
The third option, allowing the celebrity to keep control but 
forcing him to surrender equivalent amounts of other property, 
may do as much damage, through indirect financial pressure, as 
the first two options do directly. If a celebrity is forced to surren-
der a large amount of other property to equal her spouse's share of 
the value of her publicity rights, she may be under tremendous 
financial pressure to fully exploit those rights, even if she would 
prefer not to do so for personal reasons. 180 
Full exploitation may also have detrimental effects on the ce-
lebrity's career. 181 Thus, it seems strange that Rosen should be so 
concerned about "involuntary servitude" in the context of celebrity 
careers or goodwill, and be blind to a very similar phenomenon 
with publicity rights. 182 Loss of control over career choice (and its 
associated elements, like work hours, working conditions, etc.) may 
be more taxing for the celebrity, and have a bigger impact on her 
life path, but exploitation of one's identity is, arguably, a more per-
sonal choice. 
Stiffelman attempts to solve this problem through compro-
mise, treating a celebrity's publicity rights as marital property only 
in "forms of exploitation" where he has already exploited the 
rights-infringment cases involving "active" cooperation by the celebrity do not come up 
because if the celebrity was actively cooperating with the use, it probably was not unautho-
rized. Additionally, for obvious reasons, publicity rights in infringement cases are typically 
conceptualized as the negative right to exclude others from using one's identity, not as the 
positive right of someone else to force one to endorse another. Thus, there is no authority 
supporting Jacoby and Zimmerman's definition. Further, the distinction between "active" 
and "passive" uses is odd because much exploitation of a living celebrity involves active 
cooperation by that celebrity. How are mQst photographs of the celebrity to be acquired, 
for example, without the celebrity's consenting to have his picture taken? Publicity rights 
are worth substantially less for living celebrities, if some active cooperation by the celebrity 
is not included. 
180 Admittedly, this problem may be minimized to the extent that the celebrity is very 
wealthy because of her primary income generating activity (her performance), or for other 
reasons. Cf Matlow, supra note 4, at 136-37 (noting that many celebrities, such as athletes 
and entertainers, "are already very handsomely compensated for the primary activities to 
which they owe their fame" and thus that the right of publicity "redistributes wealth 
upwards"). However, the number of celebrities who have sought the protection from cred-
itors offered by the bankruptcy laws is by no means insignificant. See Jacoby & Zimmer-
man, supra note 86, at 1325-26. 
181 See, e.g., Sims, supra note 89, at 479 (noting, in a criticism of the lifetime exploitation 
requirement for inheritability, that "many celebrities have no desire to commercially ex-
ploit their names and likenesses during their lifetimes for reasons of personal sensitivity or 
professional judgment" (emphasis added)); see also Kwall, supra note 89, at 199 (noting that 
certain types of advertising, particularly "when the advertised product or service is of poor 
quality," can damage a celebrity's reputation and thus future endorsement deals and even 
"professional development"). 
182 See supra text accompanying notes 152, 153. 
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rights. 183 There are several problems with this approach. First, as a 
practical matter, it will be difficult for a judge to ascertain which 
aspects of identity a celebrity has exploited, and which he has not; 
a simpler approach is thus preferable. 184 Second, just because the 
celebrity has previously exploited his publicity rights in an area 
does not mean that he should be pressured to exploit his rights in 
that area in the future. A celebrity's choice to commercially ex-
ploit her identity is so personal, and connected to her career, that 
she should be able to rescind a previous decision to exploit her 
identity if she chooses. Third, Stiffelman sees the emotional and 
dignity interests (the privacy interests) and the economic interests 
as being much more readily separable than they really are. For 
example, a celebrity may be offended, not merely by advertise-
ments of a clearly lower quality than she has already consented to, 
(say, in Hustler versus Newsweek), but, because of the personal na-
ture of identity, she may also be offended by any unconsented ex-
ploitation, even in advertisements of similar quality (Esquire versus 
Glamour). Even these types of exploitations may involve a more 
personal, dignity-like aspect, in addition to the economic aspect, 
because any loss of control over exploitation of one's identity may 
be a strange and disturbing experience for anyone, including a ce-
lebrity.185 Also, the decision not to exploit one's identity may be as 
183 See Stiffelman, supra note 161, at ll25-28. 
184 For example, what does Stiffelman mean by "forms of exploitation"? Id. He tries to 
solve this problem by giving an illustration: 
[C]onsider the example of Lawrence Olivier, who recently appeared in a series 
of Polaroid commercials. Despite the fact that he willingly exposed his person-
ality to millions of viewers, one could argue that he retains the right to sue for 
commercial appropriation of his name and likeness for uses which might be 
less dignified and which he might consider offensive, like advertisements for a 
'girlie' magazine. The foundation for such an argument is that conventional 
privacy doctrine, insofar as it is intended to protect one's feelings, is waived not 
quantitatively (in terms of audience size) but by the demonstrated willingness 
to expose oneself in a specific qualitative connotation. By doing the Polaroid 
commercial, Olivier demonstrated a willingness to be associated with a com-
mercial product of a certain quality. It must not be assumed from this partial 
waiver that he no longer has a right to protect his image or that certain types of 
exploitation would not damage his feelings. 
Id. at 1127-28 n.137. The problem with Stiffelman's example is that it seems to rely on the 
presumed subjective valuations of the celebrity, rather than objective categories like maga-
zine versus television; this objective categorization, although easier to carry out, would ad-
mittedly be a rather illogical approach. A judge is going to have a very hard time 
determining these subjective valuations-if he asks the celebrity, he is not apt to get an 
honest answer. Perhaps past patterns of the celebrity's behavior, coupled with evidence of 
"normal" endorsement behavior in an entertainment industry, could help solve these prac-
tical issues. At any rate, valuation becomes somewhat more difficult when the right of 
publicity valued on the open market is not "all of my publicity rights," but something like 
"publicity rights in classy but not low-brow magazines." Id. 
185 See Haemmerli, supra note 173, at 422, 427-28: 
[A Kantian] philosophical orientation permits us to reconceive the right of 
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much an economic decision as a dignity decision 186-why should 
these types of economic decisions be protected from division upon 
divorce, while economic decisions to exploit one's identity are not 
protected? At any rate, the policy considerations raised in the pre-
ceding few paragraphs should at least be weighed against the policy 
gains (in equity towards the non-celebrity spouse and in support of 
the partnership theory of marriage) 187 that would stem from mak-
ing publicity rights marital property. 
Unless it is clear in the jurisdiction where a divorce is sought 
that the right to publicity is not a divisible asset, a celebrity takes a 
serious risk if there is no adjudication confirming her ownership of 
the right.188 To anticipate such a problem, a celebrity or aspiring 
celebrity may wish to include in a premarital agreement a waiver of 
her prospective spouse's claim to an interest in the right. Even if 
publicity rights are not marital property, the actual or potential in-
come the celebrity could derive from them could be considered in 
fixing the amount of alimony payable to the non celebrity spouse, 
so that her claim to participate in them might still be recognized. 
We now turn to the relevant precedent pertaining to this issue. 
2. Effect of an Obligor's Choice of Occupation or Retirement 
on Alimony Obligations 
Judicial and academic views of the extent to which alimony 
claims are affected by an obligor' s choice of a less remunerative 
occupation (or retirement) are divided. Although courts continue 
to refer to "need" as the basis for alimony awards, 189 duration of 
marriage and expected difference in post-divorce incomes are the 
publicity as a freedom-based property right with both moral and economic 
characteristics, rather than being forced to make a dichotomous choice be-
tween a privacy right concerned with moral injury on the one hand, or a purely 
pecuniary publicity right on the other ... [W]hile there is a difference between 
the self and objectification (or commodification) of self, the latter does not 
negate the former (indeed, it derives from the former); ... a property right 
which provides for control over objectification of identity is not logically op-
posed to an autonomy right that protects the self; and ... the two can, in fact, 
be viewed as two facets of freedom. What this means in reality is that even in 
the presence of commodification, a viable claim can be made to control the 
commercial exploitation of identity on both moral and economic grounds. 
186 See Stiffelman, supra note 161. 
18
' See Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 903; Piscopo, 555 A.2d at 1191, affd, 557 A.2d 1040 (NJ. 
Super. App. Div. 1989); Kranz, supra note 155, at 948. 
188 See, e.g., CAL. FAvt. CooE § 2556 (2004) (stating that court has continuing jurisdiction 
to award community estate assets that have not been previously adjudicated). See also 
BREIT R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPER"IY § 9.06 at 655 (1994) (general 
agreement that the decree can be reopened if assets are omitted because of fraud or mis-
take, and minority view that court's jurisdiction continues until all assets have been ex-
pressly divided}. 
189 See A.LL, supra note 129, § 5.02, cmt. a, at 788-89. 
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factors most consistently relied on by courts today in fixing the 
amount of alimony.190 It may then be important to determine 
whether spousal incomes for this purpose should include amounts 
that could be realized from the exploitation of either spouse's 
right to publicity. Ordinarily, of course, the question would arise 
only in determining the obligor's income, but one can imagine an 
obligor responding to a claim by a former spouse by asserting that 
her needs could be met through exploitation of her right to 
publicity. 
There is no apparent evidence of a case in which a court based 
a maintenance award on the obligor's potential increased earnings 
if he changed his occupation. However, courts have had to con-
sider whether a reduction in earnings, as a result of such a change, 
justified a reduction or termination of an alimony obligation, and 
the results have been mixed.191 An obligor's early retirement raises 
the same issue, again with mixed results in the courts. 192 And 
courts are similarly divided on whether to reduce payments be-
cause an obligor wants to leave work to seek further education. 193 
In contrast, courts and legislatures have been more inclined to 
treat a support claimant's failure to make reasonable efforts at re-
habilitation as a basis for reducing or terminating her claim to 
maintenance. 194 
The cases just referred to are generally consistent with the 
view that an obligor's failure to exploit his right to publicity should 
not cause the potential income from such exploitation to be con-
sidered in determining a maintenance obligation, but that a claim-
ant's failure to exploit her right may reduce the amount of her 
claim. In either situation, it is difficult to find a basis for disregard-
mo See id., § 5.04 Rptr's Notes cmt. d, at 828-29. 
191 Compare Stiltz v. Stiltz, 223 S.E.2d 689 (Ga. 1976) (no relief from obligation to former 
spouse while obligor attended a seminary, despite genuineness of his desire to enter the 
ministry), with Meegan v. Meegan, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799 (Cal. App. 1992) (support termi-
nated where husband resigned from his job as sales executive to attend a monastery; the 
court relied on a finding that his resignation was made "in good faith" and not just to avoid 
paying support). 
192 Compare, e.g., Sinks v. Sinks, 251 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1988) (voluntary early retirement not 
grounds for reducing support), with Bums v. Bums, 331 A.2d 768 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974) 
(reduction allowed on early retirement, in view of husband's health problems and loss of 
interest in his work after his son's death). 
193 Compare llas v. llas, 16 Cal. Rptr.2d 345 (Cal. App. 1993) (no reduction to attend 
medical school), with Overbey v. Overbey, 698 So.2d 811 (Fla. 1997). 
194 See, e.g., Berland v. Berland, 264 Cal. Rptr. 210 (Cal. App. 1989) (reduction in main-
tenance award justified because wife's rehabilitation had been delayed by her unrealistic 
efforts to find employment as a paid fundraiser); Hecker v. Hecker, 568 N.W.2d 705 
(Minn. 1997) (affinning award attributing to a dependent spouse the income that could 
have been produced by reasonable effort); OR. RF.v. STAT. § 107.412 (1996) (court shall 
tenninate support if recipient "has not made a reasonable effort during the previous ten 
years to become financially self-supporting .... "). 
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ing income actually being derived from such exploitation in deter-
mining the amount of the obligor's maintenance obligation.195 
B. Bankruptcy 
Federal bankruptcy raises different issues from those raised by 
divorce because of the interaction of state property law, exemption 
statutes and federal bankruptcy law.196 In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
proceeding, absent an applicable state exemption statute, 197 the 
bankrupt estate includes "all legal or equitable interests of the 
debtor in property,"198 and, absent any controlling federal law, 
these terms are solely creatures of state law. 199 Thus, although a 
state could determine the right of publicity is not an asset divisible 
on divorce, despite its treatment as property for other purposes, a 
state does not have a similar option in the context of bankruptcy. 
If the right is property, the only way it could be excluded from the 
bankrupt estate is by a state exemption statute.200 Absent such an 
exemption, the right could, in theory, be sold to the highest bidder 
and the proceeds used to pay creditors.201 
195 See Rosen, supra note 154, at 554 (noting that most jurisdictions use a "reimburse-
ment'' form of maintenance, because of its "flexibility," to deal with unfairness caused by 
the failure to consider degrees marital property, and stating that this approach would also 
work for celebrity careers). The advantage of a maintenance approach is that it could be 
tailored to a celebrity's preexisting level of commercial exploitation, and adjusted if the 
level of exploitation were to change; thus, a celebrity could be forced to share in any earn-
ings from her publicity rights to the extent that she has already exploited them, but would 
not be forced or even pressured to exploit her publicity rights to any extent involuntarily. 
An alternative approach, which is quite similar in practice, would be to give the non-celeb-
rity spouse a fixed share (say, half) of the celebrity spouse's future income from exploiting 
her publicity rights, without mandating that she exploit them. Cf Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 
218 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2000) (creating such a scheme in a divorce case involving a copy-
right). One problem with such an approach in the divorce context is that while it would 
generally be in the celebrity spouse's economic interest to exploit her rights, she may 
choose not to do so, not because of dignity concerns, but out of spite towards her former 
spouse. 
196 The issue is very real and may be as or even more pressing than the divorce issue; a 
"casual search" by Jacoby and Zimmerman turned up "dozens" of celebrity bankruptcies in 
the recent past. Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 86, at 1325-26. 
197 See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2000), authorizing debtors to invoke state exemption statutes 
and § 522(b), permitting states to opt out of the federal exemptions. Thirty-four states 
have done so. See 4 CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY§ 522.01 (15th rev. ed.). At least one state pro-
hibits security interests in, or levy or attachment of, publicity rights. See 765 ILL. C'..oMP. 
STAT.ANN. 1075/15. 
198 See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a) (2000). 
199 See generally Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 398 (1992). 
200 See supra note I 97. 
201 See Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 86, at 1357-58 (finding 
[t]his is where debtor-creditor law differs most starkly from the taxation and 
divorce cases .... For the most part, those cases were about sharing value, 
rather than sharing control over or, worse yet, divesting control of, the public-
ity right .... In the debtor-creditor context, by contrast, forced sale of the asset 
gives to the highest bidder complete control over the exploitation of the right 
of publicity, including the right to sue for infringement). 
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The reality, however, is that rights of publicity are not being 
treated as "property of the estate" in bankruptcy, 202 even though 
the fact that unsecured creditors rarely receive anything on ac-
count of their claims203 may provide an incentive in some celebrity 
bankruptcies to seek such treaunent. Accepting the idea that pub-
licity rights probably should be considered part of a bankrupt es-
tate under current law, the question then becomes what the state 
of the law ought to be. States could avoid a classification of public-
ity rights as property under a bankrupt estate by passing exemption 
statutes or the federal law could be altered. 
The possibility of a sale of publicity rights within a bankrupt 
estate raises the basic question of what rights the bidder would ac-
quire. In a voluntary assignment of the right of publicity, it is not 
unusual for the assignor to perform a variety of services for the 
assignee to assist in the exploitation of the right.204 However, it is 
difficult to find a legal basis for the purchaser at a sale by a bank-
ruptcy trustee to require the celebrity to perform any services 
whatsoever. 
Professors Jacoby and Zimmerman assume that involuntarily 
transferring control to a third party could result in forced labor by 
Chapters 11 and 13 work differently: rather than having a debtor's assets liquidated as 
under Chapter 7, Chapters 11 and 13 allow the debtor to keep her assets but generally 
require to pay creditors at least as much in future income as would have been netted 
through Chapter 7 liquidation. Thus, under Chapters 11 and 13, the debtor is able to 
maintain control over her publicity rights, but there are several drawbacks. First, the op-
tion is risky. Second, the pressures outlined above in Part II.A. for the third option in 
divorce cases ( celebrity keeps control over publicity rights but gives up equivalent amounts 
of other assets to the non-celebrity spouse) also apply here. See supra text accompanying 
notes 163-65. The debtor, unless she can find significant alternative productive assets, will 
effectively be forced to exploit her publicity rights to a high degree even if she would 
rather not engage in this much exploitation, in order to make the payments to her credi-
tors. In fact, the pressures experienced in this context, where a celebrity must make pay-
ments to her creditors and is, by definition, having serious financial problems, seem 
substantially more severe than the pressures of the divorce context, where a celebrity is 
simply trying to maintain a certain standard oflhing and is often quite wealthy anyway. See 
supra note 163. 
202 Professor Jacoby reports that she and Professor Zimmem1an found no evidence of 
such treatment, although there have been anecdotal reports of creditors' lawyers in celeb-
rity cases considering making the argument that the right should be so treated. See E-mail 
from Professor Jacoby (Aug. 19, 2003) (on file with authors). 
203 See LYNN M. LoPucKJ & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 
139 (3d ed. 2000) (referring to a study by the General Accounting Office of distributions 
to creditors in the 1.2 million Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases closed in the statistical years 
1991 and 1992 and finding that money reached the hands of unsecured creditors in only 
about three percent of the cases). 
204 See form for personality and endorsement agreement in 3 ALEXANDER LINDEY, L1NnEY 
ON ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING, AND THE ARTS: AGREEMENTS AND THE LAw § 14:9 (2d ed. 
1980) (form for personality and endorsement describing services to be performed by the 
celebrity as including radio and television programs and commerdals, good will tours, and 
personal appearances). 
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forcing the celebrity to perform in advertisements.205 A more seri-
ous concern is that such a transfer would give a stranger the right 
to determine how to exploit someone else's identity commercially, 
with negative personal/ dignity206 and career207 implications for the 
2or, Jacoby and Zimmerman would get around this problem by defining publicity rights 
so as only to include «passive" uses of a celebrity's identity (like using preexisting pictures 
on posters, etc), rather than "active" uses (like making a celebrity show up and shoot a 
commercial). Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 86, at 1351. As already noted, we do not 
find their definition convincing. See supra note 160. They propose that even if their defini-
tion of publicity rights is not a sound one, one should simply divide publicity rights into 
«active" and "passive" components and allow creditors to sell only the latter right. Jacoby & 
Zimmerman, supra note 86, at 1351 n.163. This might be easier said than done. How does 
one define "active" and draw the line between "active" and "passive" uses? Does "active" 
include even minor acts of cooperation, like posing for a few seconds for a photograph? If 
so, then the "passive" right of publicity that passes to creditors is, for living celebrities, 
worth substantially less then the full right of publicity. See supra note 160. Further, it is odd 
for Jacoby and Zimmerman to argue that publicity is property in the bankruptcy context 
because it is property in other contexts, and then to redefine the term 'publicity right' to 
make it different from what it was in those other contexts. 
206 Jacoby and Zimmerman note the problem of giving someone else control over a 
celebrity's identity, but then downplay the problem by noting that celebrities are only able 
to exercise control over their own identities in a fairly small sphere anyway. 
In most important regards, celebrities do not control the ways in which their 
image is presented to the public, and attempts to exercise such conu·ol would 
violate the First Amendment rights of others. Newsworthy uses of celebrity per-
sonas, even highly unflattering ones, are virtually never subject to a celebrity's 
property right. Furthermore, the very concept of alienability means that the 
law contemplates the real possibility that celebrities will assign all or part of the 
right to use their personas to others - at which point they necessarily give up, 
albeit voluntarily, any legal right to object to how the assignee uses their identi-
ties in the future. 
Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 86, at 1362. Their point about newsworthy uses is sound, 
although it does not necessarily follow that celebrities should lose even more control over 
their identity-because news (even sleazy news) is usually protected by the First Amend-
ment, advertising is one of the only realms where celebrities can offer their voice and 
voluntarily express themselves and their image to the public. The analogy to alienability is 
problematic precisely because of the point Jacoby and Zimmerman identify-alienation is 
fully voluntary, while bankruptcy seems to involve much more compulsion. It is precisely 
the involuntary loss of control that is a threat to celebrities' autonomy and dignity. If (like 
us) one is still uncomfortable with the idea of giving control of identity to a third party, 
Jacoby and Zimmerman suggest several possible compromises. First, they suggest that the 
bankruptcy court could sell only publicity rights that had already been exploited, thus 
preserving privacy and dignity for those celebrities morally opposed to any endorsements. 
Id. at 1365. One problem with this is, as Jacoby and Zimmerman note, that even celebrities 
who have already exploited some of their publicity rights may have legitimate moral objec-
tions to certain other uses of their rights. Id. Further, this risks unfairness to creditors; 
who may be kept away from unexploited publicity rights only to see the celebrity making 
bundles of money from them months later. Id. A third problem, not really noted by 
Jacoby and Zimmerman but discussed above, is that the economic and dignity interests ofa 
celebrity are really inseparable-losing control over the use of one's identity at all in the 
commercial context is an indignity, a loss of personal freedom and autonomy, as well as an 
economic issue. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. Further, as already noted, 
some people choose not to exploit their fame at all for economic and not personal rea-
sons; these people cannot be any more deserving of protection than celebrities who have 
already exploited their rights. See supra note 164 and text accompanying note 169. Jacoby 
and Zimmerman also note as a possibility that debtors could enter Chapter 11 or 13 in-
stead of Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 86, at 1367. This does 
keep control of the right in the hands of the celebrity, but its attendant pressure on the 
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celebrity. This will likely stop the celebrity from signing any en-
dorsement deals in her own right because they would be infringe-
ments of her own publicity rights,208 and conceivably could expose 
the celebrity to liability for various highly personal actions by the 
celebrity (like poor on-screen performance or a divorce) that 
sharply reduce the value of her publicity rights.209 While bank-
ruptcy filings are neither fully voluntary nor fully coercive ( except-
ing involuntary bankruptcy or involuntary state law debt 
collection), 210 there is clearly a large dose of coercion involved in 
celebrity has high costs. See supra note 173. As a final option, lhe aulhors slate lhat courts 
could do somelhing similar to what maintenance does in lhe divorce context: the celebrity 
debtor would keep full control over his publicity rights and could choose whether and 
when to exploit them, but the creditors would receive 100 percent of lhe money made by 
lhe celebrity from his endorsements. Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 86, at 1366. The 
problem wilh this approach, as Jacoby and Zimmerman point out, is lhat it leaves the 
celebrity wilh very little or no incentive to exploit his publicity rights (in this respect, the 
bankruptcy context is very different from marriage, where lhe parties split any income). 
Id. at 1366-67. Perhaps one solution to lhis problem would be to use this system but to give 
celebrity debtors a lhirty, forty or fifty percent slake in any endorsement earnings-both 
parties would probably make out better this way lhan under lhe 100 percent approach, 
although the celebrity's incentives to exploit his publicity rights are obviously still dulled 
somewhat. 
201 Jacoby and Zimmerman note that negative career implications due to third party 
control are possible, but argue that these are not likely to occur because the celebrity and 
third party owner of the publicity rights will tend to cooperate: "both sland to benefit in 
many inslances by cooperating wilh one anolher." Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 86, at 
1357. This probably has some trulh to it, but, even putting aside non-economic considera-
tions, it ignores lhe very real conflict of interest between the celebrity and the third party 
owner. The former (now lhat he no longer owns his publicity rights) is seeking to maxi-
mize future earnings from his primary income-generating activity (performances), while 
lhe latter seeks to maximize future earnings from lhe celebrity's publicity (advertising and 
merchandising). Often, increased endorsement money may translate into increased per-
formance money (as an actor becomes better known, for example, she may get more lucra-
tive roles), and vice versa. These circumstances tend to encourage cooperation. However, 
oftentimes increased endorsements may decrease performance revenue (for example, an 
actor may no longer be able to get roles because he is overexposed and the public is sick of 
him, or his endorsements are seen as lacky or annoying). Similarly, a celebrity may do 
lhings lhat are good for his performance career but bad for his endorsement career (for 
example, an alhlete may no longer make public appearances and refuse to do interviews 
because he wants his efforts to be more focused on his sport). Thus, there is no automatic 
tendency towards cooperation in many instances. Also, spite may develop between a celeb-
rity and a third party who bought that celebrity's commercial identity at auction. 
20s Jacoby and Zimmerman approve this result, stating lhat celebrities should not be 
able to put themselves into competition with the purchasers of their own publicity rights. 
Id. at 1355-56. They do acknowledge that in some circumstances, it may be difficult to 
draw the line between publicity rights (which belong exclusively to the lhird party buyer) 
and performance rights in a celebrity's primary activity (which lhey do not see as part of 
publicity rights, id. at 1351 n.163, and thus which remain with the celebrity). Id. at 1356. 
For example, if Cindy Crawford was modeling clothes, it might be difficult to tell whelher 
she was engaging in her primary profession (modeling) or endorsing the clothes she was 
wearing. Id. But they generally believe lhat courts can sort lhese issues out. Id. 
209 Jacoby and Zimmerman do not deal with lhis issue. 
210 See Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 86, at 1354 (noting that lhese two practices 
must be considered involunlary unless lhe voluntary act is the nonpayment of debt itself). 
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the decision to file for bankruptcy, and thus all of the policy con-
cerns listed above have some bite to them. 
Despite these problems, Jacoby and Zimmerman's law review 
article, the only commentary ever to address this issue, has strongly 
argued that publicity rights should be considered property for pur-
poses of bankruptcy. 211 Courts have never considered the issue, 
although one state statute has clearly come out against this posi-
tion. 212 Jacoby and Zimmerman reason by using the now familiar 
property syllogism along with some policy considerations. First, 
they note that: 
Over the last fifty years, state law increasingly has come to treat 
the ability to profit from the commercialization of one's persona 
less as a privacy interest and more as a kind of property interest, 
fully alienable, and, in many jurisdictions, descendible as well 
... [O]nce the individual persona is transformed from some-
thing purely personal into a fully alienable commodity, these 
publicity rights should be just as susceptible to forced sale in the 
debtor-creditor system as cars, boats, or businesses.213 
This use of the property syllogism is then bolstered by various 
policy considerations: avoiding the popular outcry that followed 
many celebrities' abuse of the bankruptcy system to salvage luxuri-
ous assets, like huge houses through generous homestead exemp-
tions, 214 supporting "the overall philosophy of our current debtor-
creditor system," which "puts the interests of the creditor in forcing 
the sale of the debtor's assets-publicity rights or otherwise-
2l l See id. 
212 See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1075/15 (West 2002): 
[T]he rights under this Act are not subject to levy or attachment and may not 
be the subject of a security interest. Nothing in this Section limits the ability of 
any party to levy, attach, or obtain a security interest in the proceeds of the 
rights under this Act or the proceeds of the exercise of those rights. 
It is probably correct to treat security interests the same way as involuntary attachments. 
Even though the decision to write a contract pledging one's publicity rights as collateral is 
voluntary, the inability to repay the loan is generally not, so collections of security interests 
should be treated like bankruptcy filing, not like fully voluntary contractual assignments or 
licenses. 
213 See Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 86, at 1324, 1326 (footnote omitted). Further, 
Jacoby & Zimmerman argue that since "property" in the phrase "all legal or equitable 
interests of the debtor in property," 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a) (2000), the language that deter-
mines what can be sold for the creditors and what cannot be in Chapter 7, is not defined, 
"[i]f something is a property right under state law, it is also likely to qualify as property of 
the [bankrupt] estate." Id. at 1344. Note that this is quite a different approach to defining 
property for the bankruptcy code than Miller v. Commissioner used to interpret the term 
"property" in the tax code. Jacoby & Zimmerman essentially write that what is property for 
other purposes is property for bankruptcy purposes as well, while the Miller court stressed 
that the tax context was special and had unique policy considerations. See Miller v. 
Comm 'r, 299 F.2d 706, 710-11 (2d. Cir 1962); see al.so supra text accompanying notes 29-37. 
214 Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 86, at 1363-64. 
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ahead of the preferences of the delinquent debtor,"215 and getting 
the celebrity debtor to surrender her publicity rights as a "quid pro 
quo" for the debt relief that one gets in Chapter 7 bankruptcy.216 
Finally, Jacoby and Zimmerman deal with a variety of policy-based 
counter arguments.217 They are overly driven by the property syllo-
gism; what is needed is a clear weighing of all of the involved policy 
interests against each other. 
When this weighing is done, it seems relatively clear that pub-
licity rights should not be treated as property for purposes of bank-
ruptcy. A better solution might be to let the celebrity debtor 
maintain control over her publicity rights, but give the creditors a 
fifty percent share of the proceeds from any exploitation that the 
debtor chose to pursue.218 Such a nuanced treatment would re-
quire either federal or state legislation. In its absence, celebrities 
who seek bankruptcy protection may be well advised to list their 
right of publicity as an asset, as any failure to list valuable assets 
subjects the debtor to charges of bankruptcy fraud, revocation of 
the discharge, and if it 1s serious enough, to criminal 
prosecution. 219 
CONCLUSION: A NORMATIVE EVALUATION OF THE RIGHT OF 
PUBL1CI1Y 
Having discussed the history and current contours of publicity 
rights, we are now in a position to evaluate their propriety from a 
normative standpoint. Our basic point is that it is difficult to either 
support or criticize the existence of publicity rights all that 
strongly. Contrary to the biting tone of much of the commentary, 
strong interests are not really implicated either way. Instead, a 
215 Id. at 1364. 
216 Id. 
217 Most of these counterarguments are explored, supra, notes 164-167, 169-170. Jacoby 
and Zimmerman also note some other counterarguments that are less relevant here. For 
example, they reject the idea that involuntarily selling a celebrity's publicity rights consti-
tutes forced association. See Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 86, at 1363: 
In the first place, the scope of associational rights under the Constitution is not 
very well defined, and the likelihood that the First Amendment protects what 
arguably are mostly economic activities and interests is particularly uncertain. 
Second, much of what motivates the desire not to associate with commercial 
enterprises appears to reflect personal taste rather than issues of constitutional 
stature, such as deep-seated belief systems, political affiliations, or concern with 
social causes. 
(footnotes omitted). 
21s For an explanation of why this policy would solve many of the policy problems listed 
above, see supra note 176. 
219 Concealment of assets can constitute bankruptcy fraud, see 18 U.S.C. § 157 (2000) 
and constitutes a class D felony. See id. at§ 152. Concealment can constitute grounds for 
denying or provoking the debtor's discharge. See] I U.S.C. § 727 (2000). 
         
118 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 23:71 
more powerful approach to both supporting and criticizing public-
ity rights focuses on the policy effects of a given expansion or re-
duction in the contours of the right. In this kind of focused, 
nuanced debate (as opposed to the kind of general debate that has 
dominated the most important publicity rights literature thus far), 
our uncovering of the property syllogism has much to say. 
While there has been a raging debate between supporters and 
critics of publicity rights about whether the rights should exist at 
al1, the stakes involved in the general debate ultin1ately seem low. 
The primary argument enlisted in favor of publicity rights is some 
claim of unjust enrichment linked to the labor theory of value:220 
celebrities work hard to create their famous identities, and thus 
they should have the right to exploit their publicity rights without 
having them stolen by others. A group of postmodern-influenced 
scholars, led by Michael Matlow, has at least greatly diminished the 
intuitive force of this argument. These scholars point out that ce-
lebrities do not make their image in the same W<J-Y as a carpenter 
makes a chair:221 fame is largely conferred by the media and the 
public ( often being recoded and being given new meaning by cer-
tain public groups),222 and is largely controlled not by the celebrity 
herself but by an army of consultants, agents, publicists, etc.223 In-
220 For an early proponent of the labor theory and unjust enrichment as the underpin-
ning of publicity rights, see Nimmer, supra note 15, at 216 (stating: 
[i]t would seem to be a first principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence, an 
axiom of the most fundamental nature, that every person is entitled to the fruit 
of his labors unless there are important countervailing policy considerations. 
Yet, because of the inadequacy of traditional legal theories .... persons who 
have long and laboriously nurtured the fruit of publicity values may be de-
prived of them, unless judicial recognition is given to . . . the right of 
publicity .... ). 
See also.Uhlaender v. Henrickson, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970) (stating: 
[i]t is this court's view that a celebrity has a legitimate proprietary interest in his 
public personality. A celebrity must be considered to have invested his years of 
practice and competition in a public personality which eventually may reach 
marketable status. That identity, embodied in his name, likeness, statistics and 
other personal characteristics, is the fruit of his labors and is a type of 
property). 
Unjust enrichment is often presented as a separate argument from the labor theory argu-
ment. See, e.g., Matlow, supra note 4, at 182, 196. But this makes little sense, because with-
out some other normative content, the unjust enrichment idea is essentially vacuous-in 
order for the enrichment to be "unjust," the celebrity must have some moral claim to it. 
221 Matlow, supra note 4, at 183 (citing Eileen R. Reilly, Note, The Right of Publicity for 
Political Figures: Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heri-
tage Products, 46 U. Ptrr. L. REv. 1161, 1168 n.37 (1985)). 
222 The well-known example given by Matlow is how Judy Garland was remade by urban 
gay men in the 1940's and 1950's into a symbol of themselves. See id. at 194-95 (citing 
RICHARD DYER, HEAVENLY BODIES: FILM STARS AND SoCIE'IY (1986)); see also Rosemary J. 
Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Inudlectual Property Law and Democratic Dia-
wgue, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1853, 186~4 (1991). 
223 Matlow, supra note 4, at 184-96; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We are Symhols and Inhabit 
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deed, the critical importance of the media and the public in creat-
ing value for a celebrity's right of publicity can be taken to support 
the view that most of that value may be socially created, not unlike 
the value of a choice piece of real estate in an urban area. Further, 
current celebrities often borrow their images from past celebri-
ties. 224 Finally, the law does not always protect labor as a natural 
right;225 commercial borrowing from others is not, as a general 
rule, protected in the absence of some special reason for doing 
so.226 
A second basis for supporting publicity rights, which has also 
been thoroughly discredited, is to provide economic incentives. 
For example, one could argue publicity rights are necessary to in-
duce people to seek fame or to enhance fame they already have 
achieved.227 The critics have two convincing counterpoints. First, 
such an incentive may not be a good thing as it may lead to over-
investment in fame. More specifically, it may also encourage cer-
tain social groups (like young black men) to spend much of their 
energy trying to surmount the considerable odds against newcom-
ers becoming celebrities, thus producing negative distributional 
consequences.228 Second, even if this incentive effect is desirable, 
its magnitude is likely to be minor because celebrities are usually 
already wealthy from their primary performance activities and have 
the ability to make substantial sums of money from advertising 
even without publicity rights.229 We note that England does not 
Symbols, So Should We Be Paying Rent?, Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 
123 CowM-VlAj.L. & ARTS 123, 141-144 (1996). 
224 Madow, supra note 4, at 196-98; David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, LAw & 
CoNTEMP. PROBS .. 147, 161-63 (Autumn 1981). 
225 See Madow, supra note 4, at 183-84. One notes, for example, that, in copyright, facts 
themselves are not generally protected, even though the discovery of these facts may in-
volve some "sweat of the brow" by the discoverer. See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. 
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
226 See Madow, supra note 4, at 200-03. 
227 The most famous case to make this argument is :lacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 
433 U.S. 562, 576-77 (1977). One should note that the argument made sense on the facts 
of :lacchini, which was a performance rights case-copying the performance on which a 
performer's livelihood is based very likely will act as a substantial disincentive. But the 
argument has also carried over to traditional publicity rights cases. See, e.g., Carson v. 
Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983); Martin Luther 
King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc., v. Am. Heritage Prods., 296 S.E.2d 697, 705 (Ga. 
1982); see also Felcher, supra note 58, at J 128 ("The social policy underlying the right of 
publicity is encouragement of individual enterprise and creativity by allowing people to 
profit from their own efforL~."). 
228 Madow, supra note 4, at 208-219. 
229 Id. at 208-11. Notably, even many economists do not seem to buy this incentive argu-
ment. See, e.g., Vincent M. de Grandpre, Understanding the Market for Celebrity: An Economic 
Analysis of the Right of Publicity, 12 FoRDHAM lNTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 73, 101-03 
(2002) (arguing that the incentives argument is unsound and adopting instead an alloca-
tive efficiency argument as the economic basis for publicity rights). Richard A Posner, 771e 
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protect publicity rights and yet it appears to have no shortage of 
celebrities. 230 
A third argument is also economic but focuses on allocative 
efficiency rather than dynamic efficiency (incentives). The argu-
ment is that lack of protection will lead to overexploitation of a 
given celebrity's identity, utilizing the identity until it becomes 
worthless-a version of the tragedy of the commons. In contrast, 
publicity rights, by forcing advertisers to pay fair market value for a 
celebrity's image, will avoid this problem and will also ensure that 
celebrity identity goes only to those advertisers who value it most 
highly and are thus willing to pay the highest price.231 As Madow 
points out, one problem with this argument is that it appears, at 
the least, to be difficult to overexploit celebrity identity and there-
fore decrease the value of that identity: often times extra exposure 
simply increases the value of a persona.232 Also, publicity is in 
some ways not like other goods because the level of substitutability 
is so high. If advertisers run one celebrity's image into the ground, 
they can either turn to another celebrity or turn to another adver-
tising technique to sell their product.233 Finally, the argument has 
not been popular with courts, perhaps because it does not capture 
what many people believe to be intuitively wrong with the uncon-
sented commercial use of another's identity.234 
With the labor theory and economic arguments thoroughly re-
butted, the only theory in support of publicity rights left standing is 
Dean Haemmerli's theory linking publicity rights to Kantian ideas 
about human freedom, autonomy, and control.235 Haemmerli's ar-
gument is really an application of Radin's important contribution 
that some types of property are more essential to personhood than 
Right of Privacy, 12 CA. L. REv. 393, 411 (1978) (arguing that the appropriation tort is 
economically justified by an allocative efficiency argument and not even mentioning the 
incentive argument). 
230 See, e.g., Kevin M. Fisher, Comment, Which Path to Follow: A Comparative Perspective on 
the Right of Publicity, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 95, 107-12 (noting that England has rejected 
publicity rights). As well, publicity rights did not exist before this century and yet there 
were plenty of celebrities before then. See, e.g., de Crandpre, supra note 229, at 103 
("[F]ame pre-existed the right of publicity and no one apparently needed the law's protec-
tion to become famous before this century."). 
231 See de Crandpre, supra note 229, at 103--08; Posner, supra note 229, at 411. 
232 Madow, supra note 4, at 221-22. Madow also notes that the argument really fails if 
there are high transaction costs involved. See id. at 223-24. 
233 Id. at 224-25. 
234 Id. at 225 (stating: 
no court, to my knowledge, has ever put this argument forward in support of 
the right of publicity .... I suspect the failure of Posner's argument to attract 
any judicial support ... has something to do with the fact that [it] captures 
next to nothing of what most people ... believe to be wrong with the unautho-
rized commercial appropriation of famous personalities). 
235 Haemmerli, supra note 173; see also supra notes 154, 168. 
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other types, and this more personal property should be (and some-
times is) given the most protection in our legal system.236 This ar-
gument has some intuitive plausibility to it, and stands up very well 
against the objections of the postmodernist critics, though no 
courts have adopted this approach. 237 
If the critics of publicity rights are good at tearing down posi-
tive arguments for a right of publicity, they are not nearly as good 
at building their own positive case against those rights. The pri-
mary complaint of these critics is that the right of publicity in-
fringes on the public domain and free speech rights by limiting the 
public's ability to use these rights in discourse: "publicity rights fa-
cilitate private censorship of popular culture."238 They especially 
harm marginalized groups, who often recode celebrities to use 
them as symbols of their oppressed identities.239 The problem with 
this argument is that the right to publicity only covers commercial 
uses like advertising and merchandising, and thus it is hard to im-
agine how its damage to popular culture would be all that great. 
Further, Madow argues that publicity rights are objectionable be-
cause they "redistribute wealth upwards."240 This is certainly true, 
but most other forms of property within our system have the same 
effect, making it unclear why publicity rights should be singled 
out.241 
As we have seen, neither those favoring publicity rights nor 
those opposed to publicity rights have managed to articulate partic-
ularly strong policy rationales supporting their positions. This gives 
the whole debate an odd character. McCarthy, probably the 
staunchest defender of publicity rights (and author of the only 
treatise on the topic) has asked "why not" have publicity rights; 
they seem to make sense and the critics have not made any con-
236 Radin, supra note 173. 
237 See Haemmerli, supra note 173, at 430-41. 
238 See, e.g., Madow, supra note 4, at 138. 
239 The most common example that is used is urban gay men's recoding of "Judy Gar-
land" to make her a symbol of gay identity in the 1940s and 1950s. See supra note 187. 
240 Madow, supra note 4, at 137 (emphasis added). 
241 Some final concerns, which, in our view, support limiting the right in this manner, 
are the social costs in litigation expenses and attorneys' fees for legal advice that recogni-
tion of any new form of property inevitably entails. Furthermore, such expenses may be 
only the tip of the iceberg, if the dimensions of the new form are sufficiently uncertain to 
deter commercial activity that might otherwise take place because of concerns about possi-
ble liability. For a discussion of the high cost of legal services, see generally Gillian K. 
Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for LaW'jers Distarts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L 
.R.Ev. 953 (2000). The writer cites the estimate of an experienced litigator of "a minimum 
of $100,000 to litigate a straightforward business claim." Id. at 957. An illustration that is 
particularly relevant to the right of publicity is a successful suit by a Canadian judge against 
a satirical magazine for $75,000 damages; his fees were $20,000, and the magazine's were 
$40,000. See id. at 954. 
         
122 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAJNMENT [Vol. 23:71 
vincing arguments against them.242 Matlow responds to this chal-
lenge by asking instead, why? 
Property rights in our culture's basic linguistic, symbolic, and 
discursive raw materials should not be created unless a clear and 
convincing showing is made that very substantial social interests 
will thereby be served ... [N]o such showing has yet been made 
with respect to star images. The proponents of publicity rights 
still have work to do to persuade us why these images should not 
be treated as part of our cultural commons, freely available for 
use in the creation of new cultural meanings and social identi-
ties, as well as new economic values. 243 
The reason these two commentators put so much emphasis on 
what is essentially a burden-shifting exercise is that the commenta-
tor who successfully shifts the burden to the other party effectively 
wins the argument, since neither side can marshal convincing argu-
ments in favor of their own position. 
Thus, the right of publicity is both hard to object to and hard 
to support. It is then pointless to debate in general terms whether 
the right ought to exist at all. A much more fruitful argument 
would analyze the precise contours and characteristics of the right, 
to see whether it ought be expanded or cut back along each given 
dimension. There is a very strong argument, first made by Judge 
Frank in Haelan fifty years ago, in favor of allowing publicity rights 
to be assignable: celebrities and advertisers have started behaving 
this way by creating exclusive contracts and the like, and the law 
should generally adapt, in a commercial context, to common busi-
ness practices, which are presumptively efficient for the _parties in-
volved.244 However, this argument provides support for treating 
publicity rights as property only in specific commercial contexts, 
such as assignments and licenses during the life of the celebrity 
and perhaps for some very limited period after her death. In con-
trast, certain property-like attributes that the right has already ac-
crued arguably do not make sense, like inheritability and exposure 
to the estate tax,245 and it is in danger of accruing yet more attrib-
utes, including treatment as marital property upon divorce246 and 
treatment as property within a bankrupt's estate.247 
Judge Frank stood on particularly solid ground when he ere-
242 1 McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2.3. 
243 Madow, supra note 4, at 239. 
244 See text accompanying notes 21-28. 
245 See supra Part I.D. 
246 See supra Part II.A. 
247 See supra Part 11.B. 
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ated a new right out of preexisting business practices. This may be 
one situation where it is desirable to create new forms of property. 
However, judges and commentators alike should not fall victim to 
the property syllogism. They should not assume that just because 
something has been labeled property for one purpose, particularly 
where it is intellectual property, all of the attributes typically associ-
ated with property should automatically apply. Rather, particularly 
where one is dealing with such a peculiarly personal property right 
as the right of publicity, the proper approach is the one taken in 
this essay: to weigh competing policy concerns against one another 
every time a new context arises in which the label of property has 
consequences. Legislatures, bureaucrats, and judges faced with a 
Hae/an-like situation in the future-poised to give something an 
aspect of property-like treatment for some narrow functionalist 
purpose-would do well to heed the warning implicit in the story 
of the publicity right's expansion. The formalist constructs of legal 
reasoning may eventually create out of their actions a Frankenstein 
bearing little resemblance to the founder's carefully considered 
functionalist purposes. 
